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ABSTRACT 
As information disclosure policies become a more popular and widespread regulatory tool, speakers 
are increasingly challenging such policies as a violation of their freedom of speech.  The First 
Amendment limits on compelled commercial speech, however, have received little elaboration since 
the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council.  The new 
challenges to information disclosure policies threaten to unsettle the compelled commercial speech 
doctrine without appropriate recognition of the First Amendment values at stake, and to impose 
significant limits on the state’s ability to compel the inclusion of factual information in 
commercial speech in the service of the substantial state interests. While Zauderer indicates that 
compelled commercial disclosures are subject to rational basis review, questions remain about what 
interests can justify such disclosures, the types of disclosures that can be compelled, and what forms 
of speech qualify as commercial speech.  I conclude that compelled factual disclosures affecting 
speech whose context and content is commercial should be subject to rational basis scrutiny as long 
as (1) the disclosure serves the state’s interest in an informed public, and (2) the disclosure informs 
the audience instead of spreading the government’s normative message.  I will develop this 
conclusion by looking to recent First Amendment challenges to (1) the FDA’s Final Rule requiring 
tobacco packages and advertisements to include warning labels that have graphic images of the 
consequences of tobacco addition, and (2) city laws requiring organizations providing services to 
pregnant women to disclose the scope of their services.  These recent legal challenges illustrate the 
need for a new test for compelled commercial speech that adequately protects speakers’ First 
Amendment rights, as well as the audience’s informational interests.   
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Government-compelled commercial speech is ubiquitous.  The 
government requires that cigarette and alcohol packaging display 
health warnings, corporations file financial disclosure reports, new 
cars’ showroom stickers include vehicles’ safety ratings, and food la-
bels display ingredients and nutritional content.1  These are but a few 
examples of the ways in which the government requires private actors 
to ‘speak’ in order to give the public more information about prod-
ucts and services in the commercial marketplace.  Despite the preva-
lence and widespread acceptance of disclosure policies as an im-
portant regulatory tool, recent First Amendment challenges threaten 
to impose significant limits on the state’s ability to compel commer-
cial disclosures that serve substantial state goals. 
The First Amendment “guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term 
necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not 
to say.”2  However, very little doctrine analyzes the First Amendment 
implications of compelled commercial disclosures.  Instead, the con-
stitutionality of government-mandated commercial disclosures rests 
on the Supreme Court’s twenty-seven-year-old decision in Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel.3  In Zauderer, the Court held that the state 
can require commercial speech to include “purely factual and uncon-
troversial information” without violating the First Amendment “as 
long as the [State’s] disclosure requirements are reasonably related 
to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”4  Even 
as mandated disclosures have become an increasingly popular form 
 
 1  See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM, & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE:  THE PERILS AND 
PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 3–7 (2007). 
 2 Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (emphasis omitted). 
 3 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 4 Id. at 651. 
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of government regulation, there has been little elaboration on the 
scope of Zauderer’s holding. 
One of the reasons that so little doctrine and academic writing 
explores the First Amendment implications of compelled commercial 
disclosures is because so few of these policies have actually been chal-
lenged in the courts on First Amendment grounds.5  In recent years, 
however, a number of legal challenges to disclosure policies have 
forced the lower courts to consider the scope and applicability of 
Zauderer’s holding.  Given these new legal challenges to compelled 
disclosure policies, courts have the opportunity to clarify the ques-
tions left open by Zauderer and to articulate a coherent doctrine that 
analyzes the First Amendment implications of government-mandated 
commercial speech.  With this opportunity, however, also comes the 
danger that courts will either limit or expand Zauderer’s holding with-
out recognizing the pertinent First Amendment values at stake. 
There are three important questions facing the courts as they ana-
lyze First Amendment challenges to compelled factual disclosures.  
First, the courts must decide whether disclosure policies that serve 
state interests other than curing consumer deception qualify for Zau-
derer’s rational basis review.  While some circuits have read Zauderer as 
condoning disclosure policies that serve other valid state interests,6 
the D.C. Circuit recently limited Zauderer to disclosure policies curing 
consumer deception.7  The Supreme Court, however, has yet to con-
front this question, and Zauderer’s language is less than clear.  Se-
cond, the courts must evaluate what types of speech can be com-
pelled under Zauderer by deciding when a disclosure ceases to provide 
“purely factual and uncontroversial information,” and instead re-
quires the speaker to recite a government message.  Third, since Zau-
derer only applies to commercial speech, the courts must confront the 
First Amendment doctrine’s confused definition of commercial 
 
 5 Justice Thomas noted the lack of clarity in the compelled commercial speech doctrine in 
his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Borgner v. Florida Board of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 
1080, 1082 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), when stating that:  
“Our decisions have not presumptively endorsed government-scripted disclaimers or suf-
ficiently clarified the nature and the quality of the evidence a State must present to show 
that the challenged legislation directly advances the governmental interest asserted.”  Id. 
 6 Most notably, the Second Circuit has adopted this expansive reading of Zauderer.  See Nat’l 
Elec. Mfg. Assoc. v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2nd Cir. 2001) (applying Zauderer to a dis-
closure policy designed to raise consumer awareness of the presence of mercury in cer-
tain products). 
 7 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063, 2012 WL 3632003, at *8 (D.C. 
Cir. Aug. 24, 2012) (“[B]y its own terms, Zauderer’s holding is limited to cases in which 
disclosure requirements are ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing de-
ception of consumers.’” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651)). 
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speech in deciding what types of speech can be required to include 
factual disclosures.  Courts must decide whether Zauderer’s rational 
basis test should be strictly limited to laws that require disclosures in 
the context of commercial transactions, and if not so limited, what 
other types of speech fall within the definition of commercial speech. 
This Article begins with an analysis of the current compelled 
commercial speech doctrine and its underlying First Amendment 
theories.  I then address the three questions discussed above in order 
to articulate a workable test for when disclosure requirements should 
be subject to Zauderer’s rational basis review given the First Amend-
ment interests at stake.  Under my proposed test, compelled factual 
disclosures affecting speech whose context and content is commercial 
should be subject to rational basis scrutiny as long as:  (1) the disclo-
sure serves the state’s interest in an informed public, and (2) the dis-
closure informs the audience for the commercial speech instead of 
spreading the government’s normative message. 
First, I analyze whether Zauderer should apply to disclosures serv-
ing a broader range of state interests by looking to Zauderer’s reason-
ing itself, lower court doctrine addressing this question, and the poli-
cy reasons supporting a broad reading of the scope of state interests.  
I conclude that Zauderer should apply to commercial disclosure laws 
that serve the state’s interest in an informed public, even if the 
speaker has not engaged in deceptive or misleading speech. 
Second, in order to develop a better understanding of what 
should qualify as a “factual” disclosure, I look to recent laws requiring 
that tobacco products be accompanied by graphic warnings that pro-
vide visual depictions of the negative health consequences of smok-
ing.  I conclude that Zauderer does not apply when the government 
compels normative speech that tells consumers how they should be-
have, and that for compelled visual disclosures, courts will need to 
look to the government’s purpose for mandating the disclosure in 
order to decide whether the graphic displays factual information or a 
normative message.  I conclude that the graphic tobacco warnings do 
not merely display factual information because the government’s 
purpose in mandating the warnings is not to inform consumers, but 
rather to advance the government’s normative message “do not 
smoke” through shock and disgust.  While this conclusion does not 
mean that the graphic warning law is per se unconstitutional, it does 
mean that the law should be subject to more than rational basis scru-
tiny. 
Third, given that Zauderer only applies to commercial speech, the 
final section addresses how to determine whether a given speech act 
qualifies as commercial speech.  I analyze recent laws requiring facili-
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ties that provide women with pregnancy-related services to disclose 
whether a medical provider is on staff and/or the scope of services 
provided at the facility.  Because these facilities often provide services 
free-of-charge, lower federal courts have concluded that the facilities’ 
speech falls outside the commercial speech doctrine and that Zauder-
er, consequently, does not apply.  However, I conclude that such a 
narrow definition of commercial speech fails to appreciate that the 
purpose of the commercial speech doctrine is to protect the informa-
tional interests of the listener-audience, and that a more contextual, 
multi-factor analysis is needed.  From the perspective of the speech’s 
audience, women who are or may be pregnant, these facilities are 
service-providers competing with other market participants that pro-
vide pregnancy-related services.  While Zauderer should not be applied 
to ideological speech that forms part of the public discourse,8 I con-
clude that compelled disclosures applied to speech whose context 
and content is of a commercial nature should be subject to rational 
basis review, regardless of whether the speaker has an economic mo-
tivation for engaging in the speech. 
As courts consider the proper scope of Zauderer in a variety of fac-
tual contexts, there is the possibility that the doctrine may become 
even more confused.  By taking a step back and evaluating Zauderer’s 
scope in light of the origins and purposes of the compelled commer-
cial speech doctrine, this Article will articulate a coherent test that 
both recognizes the First Amendment values at stake while also giving 
appropriate weight to the substantial interests served by such disclo-
sure policies. 
I.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS ON COMPELLED SPEECH:  THE 
ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court’s compelled speech doctrine began with the 
1943 case West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.9  This case 
“is seen as enshrining the principle of First Amendment protection 
against compelled speech.”10  In Barnette, a family of Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses challenged the West Virginia State Board of Education’s re-
 
 8 For example, lesser scrutiny would not apply if the state passed a law requiring disclosures 
to be given during religious sermons.  This type of law would impermissibly interfere with 
ideological speech.  See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) 
(“[W]here . . . the component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, we 
cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to anoth-
er phrase.”). 
 9 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 10 Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 847, 851 (2011). 
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quirement that all schoolchildren begin the school day by reciting 
the pledge of allegiance and saluting the American flag.  Students 
who refused to participate in this compulsory ceremony were ex-
pelled, and their parents faced criminal prosecution.11  The Court 
struck down this requirement as interfering with “the sphere of intel-
lect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our 
Constitution to reserve from all official control.”12  The Court justified 
its conclusion that the First Amendment prohibited this form of 
compelled speech by pointing to the Amendment’s applicability to 
restrictions on speech—to uphold the compelled pledge and salute 
would mean that “a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right 
to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel 
him to utter what is not in his mind.”13  The Court rejected such a 
narrow reading of the First Amendment and made the following oft-
cited pronouncement:  “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what 
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters 
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith there-
in.”14  The compelled speech doctrine’s origins can be traced back to 
Barnette’s prohibition on mandating private individuals to engage in 
“public declarations of ideological positions.”15 
The Court extended Barnette’s reasoning in the 1977 case Wooley v. 
Maynard.16  In Wooley, the plaintiff, who was also a follower of the Je-
hovah’s Witness faith, sought to invalidate New Hampshire’s re-
quirement that all noncommercial vehicles bear a license plate em-
bossed with the state’s motto:  “Live Free or Die.”  The plaintiff 
argued that the state law coerced him into “advertising a slogan 
which I find morally, ethically, religiously and politically abhorrent.”17  
The Court, citing Barnette, began with a broad pronouncement about 
the First Amendment’s protection against compelled speech: 
We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought pro-
tected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the 
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.  A sys-
tem which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideo-
logical causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to 
foster such concepts.  The right to speak and the right to refrain from 
 
 11 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629. 
 12 Id. at 642. 
 13 Id. at 634. 
 14 Id. at 642. 
 15 Stern, supra note 10, at 900. 
 16 430 U.S. 705, 706 (1977). 
 17 Id. at 713 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of “in-
dividual freedom of mind.”18 
While recognizing that Barnette “involved a more serious infringe-
ment upon personal liberties than the passive act of carrying the state 
motto on a license plate,”19 the Court overturned New Hampshire’s 
license plate law after concluding that the difference was merely a 
matter of degree.  In both cases, the Court was “faced with a state 
measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily life . . . to be 
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point 
of view he finds unacceptable.”20 
A. Distinguishing Compelled Commercial Speech 
Despite the Court’s broad pronouncements about the First 
Amendment’s protection against compelled speech, Zauderer reduces 
the level of scrutiny for compulsory factual disclosure laws targeting 
commercial speech.  In Zauderer, an Ohio attorney challenged the 
state’s rule requiring advertisements offering legal services on a con-
tingency-fee basis to include a statement indicating whether a client is 
liable for costs if his claim is unsuccessful.21  The Court first noted the 
“material differences between disclosure requirements and outright 
prohibitions on speech.”22  While recognizing prior holdings that “in 
some instances compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First 
Amendment as prohibitions on speech,” the Court rejected the plain-
tiff’s argument that Ohio’s rule imposed compelled speech of the 
type considered in Barnette and Wooley because “the interests at stake 
in this case are not of the same order.”23  Instead of forcing Ohio at-
torneys to express the state’s ideological position, the State “has at-
tempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial ad-
vertising, and its prescription has taken the form of a requirement 
that appellant include in his advertising purely factual and uncontro-
versial information about the terms under which his services will be 
available.”24 
The Court’s analysis in Zauderer was directly tied to its classifica-
tion of the type of speech that was affected by Ohio’s law.  Attorney 
advertisements qualified as commercial speech, a type of speech that 
 
 18 Id. at 714 (citations omitted) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637). 
 19 Id. at 715. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 650–51. 
 24 Id. at 651. 
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received little, if any, First Amendment protection until the Court’s 
1976 decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc.25  In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court evaluated the 
constitutionality of a Virginia statute prohibiting pharmacists from 
advertising the prices of prescription drugs.  The Court was confront-
ed squarely with the question of whether commercial speech, de-
scribed in Virginia Pharmacy as “speech which does no more than 
propose a commercial transaction,”26 was devoid of First Amendment 
protection.  Noting that an individual’s economic motivation for 
speaking does not “disqualif[y] him from protection under the First 
Amendment,”27 and that a “consumer’s interest in the free flow of 
commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, 
than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate,”28 the 
Court extended the First Amendment’s protections to commercial 
speech.  In doing so, the Court recognized that society’s interest in 
the free flow of commercial information serves the First Amend-
ment’s goal of “enlighten[ed] public decisionmaking in a democra-
cy.”29 
The Court recognized, however, that commercial speech warrants 
“a different degree of protection” than other speech, and, foreshad-
owing Zauderer, noted that it may be “appropriate to require that a 
commercial message appear in such a form, or include such addi-
tional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to pre-
vent its being deceptive.”30  The Court later clarified in another semi-
nal commercial speech decision, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission of New York,31 that “[t]he protection available 
for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the 
expression and of the governmental interests served by its regula-
 
 25 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  While the Court had not squarely held that commercial speech re-
ceived no First Amendment protection, cases before Virginia Pharmacy strongly suggested 
such a result.  See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1951) (upholding 
conviction of ordinance prohibiting door-to-door magazine subscription solicitation and 
distinguishing religious solicitation, which involves “no element of the commercial”); 
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that while the First Amend-
ment would prohibit the State from banning handbills in public spaces, it imposes “no 
such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising”). 
 26 425 U.S. at 762 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 763. 
 29 Id. at 765. 
 30 Id. at 771 n.24. 
 31 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
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tion.”32  The Central Hudson Court outlined a four-part test for analyz-
ing commercial speech regulations: 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by 
the First Amendment.  For commercial speech to come within that provi-
sion, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Next, 
we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.  If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regula-
tion directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it 
is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.33 
It was against the backdrop of the new, and yet reduced, level of 
protection for commercial speech that Zauderer was decided.  The 
Court cites to Virginia Pharmacy in recognizing that “[b]ecause the ex-
tension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justi-
fied principally by the value to consumers of the information such 
speech provides, appellant’s constitutionally protected interest in not 
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is min-
imal.”34  And instead of applying Central Hudson’s four-part test, the 
Court adopts rational basis review, recognizing that: 
[I]n virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date, we have em-
phasized that because disclosure requirements trench much more nar-
rowly on an advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, 
“warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in or-
der to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.”35 
The Court holds that a compelled disclosure law imposed on com-
mercial speech is constitutional so long as it is “reasonably related to 
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”36  While 
the Court places a limit on disclosures by cautioning that “unjustified 
or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the 
First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech,”37 the 
Court’s language suggests that the only First Amendment interest 
implicated by compelled commercial disclosures of purely factual in-
formation is the potential that the disclosure will prevent the speaker 
from engaging in protected, truthful commercial speech. 
B.  Compelled Factual Disclosures in Public Discourse 
As this Article makes clear, Zauderer leaves open many questions 
about the applicability of its rational basis test to other types of factual 
 
 32 Id. at 563. 
 33 Id. at 566. 
 34 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (citation omitted). 
 35 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)). 
 36 Id. (footnote omitted).  
 37 Id. 
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disclosure laws.  Very soon after Zauderer, however, the Court was pre-
sented with an opportunity to clarify the First Amendment implica-
tions of factual disclosure laws that interfere with fully-protected 
speech.  Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.38 
includes broad language indicating that compelled factual disclosures 
are impermissible outside of the commercial speech context:  
“[t]here is certainly some difference between compelled speech and 
compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the differ-
ence is without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment 
guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily comprising the 
decision of both what to say and what not to say.”39  While there has 
been much criticism of the Court’s broad language,40 given that the 
Court’s reasoning was closely tied to the effect of Riley’s factual disclo-
sure on fully-protected, ideological speech,41 it is possible to read Riley 
as suggesting that full First Amendment protection applies to factual 
disclosures imposed on any speech that does not qualify as “commer-
cial speech” under the Court’s precedents.42 
 
 38 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
 39 Id. at 796–97. 
 40 See David W. Ogden, Is There a First Amendment “Right to Remain Silent”?:  The Supreme 
Court’s “compelled speech” doctrine, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 368, 370–71 (1993) (discussing how 
Riley’s language “appears to be overbroad” and goes “far beyond the prior case law”). 
 41 In Riley, the Court considered a North Carolina law requiring professional fundraisers 
soliciting charitable donations to disclose the percentage of the donation that they would 
retain as their fee.  The Court concluded that the commercial speech doctrine did not 
apply because the commercial elements of the speech were “inextricably intertwined” 
with the fundraisers’ ideological advocacy.  Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.  Although the fundrais-
ers were assuredly soliciting money, the Court was concerned with “the reality that solici-
tation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech” 
and that “without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely 
cease.”  Id.  Thus, it is important to read the language in Riley in light of the Court’s con-
cern about the effect that the disclosure would have on the fundraisers’ ideological, and 
thus fully-protected, speech—the Court was very concerned with the possibility that the 
disclosure would “hamper the legitimate efforts of professional fundraisers to raise mon-
ey for the charities they represent.”  Id. at 799.  The disclosure would make solicitation 
more difficult, as potential donors would be less likely to give funds if informed that the 
fundraiser was retaining a high percentage of the donation.  The Court believed that the 
disclosure would thereby make it more difficult for charities, particularly smaller and 
more unpopular charities, to engage in their ideological advocacy.  Id. at 799–800. 
 42 But see Stern, supra note 10, at 914–15 (discussing Riley and concluding that “negative 
speech rights appear to draw strength largely from combination with separate constitu-
tionally cognizable interests”).  Moreover, it is worth noting that, alongside its broad lan-
guage, Riley also suggests that more limited factual disclosures are permissible under the 
First Amendment, even when imposed on fully-protected speech.  For example, the Court 
speaks favorably of an unchallenged provision of the law requiring the fundraisers to dis-
close their professional status to potential donors, and explicitly cautions that “nothing in 
this opinion should be taken to suggest that the State may not require a fundraiser to dis-
close unambiguously his or her professional status.”  Riley, 487 U.S. at 799 n.11.  The 
!
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Though this Article will focus on the scope of Zauderer, the Court’s 
language in Riley serves as an important reminder of the constitution-
al stakes of extending complete First Amendment protection to com-
pelled factual disclosures, and the significance of the boundary be-
tween commercial and non-commercial speech.  If Riley applied to 
disclosures in commercial speech, the government would be severely 
restricted in its ability to compel factual disclosures.  The importance 
of articulating a coherent definition of commercial speech becomes 
all the more clear when one considers the alternative strict First 
Amendment scrutiny presented by a broad reading of Riley. 
II.  THEORIES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT:  FACTUAL DISCLOSURES 
IMPOSED ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH SERVE FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES 
Now that I have provided a brief overview of the state of the com-
pelled speech doctrine, it is worth exploring the theoretical justifica-
tions underlying the Court’s decision to give lesser scrutiny to regula-
tions compelling factual commercial speech.  The First Amendment 
theories supporting Zauderer help to illustrate the values at stake in 
deciding whether and how to extend Zauderer to new types of disclo-
sure laws. 
A. Marketplace of Ideas and Democratic Self-Governance 
The concept of the First Amendment as protecting a “marketplace 
of ideas” in which robust debate will ultimately lead to discovery of 
truth was injected into Supreme Court jurisprudence by Justice 
Holmes in his 1919 dissent in Abrams v. United States.43  Rooted in the 
philosophies of John Milton and John Stuart Mill, the “marketplace 
of ideas” has come to be viewed as “essential to effective popular par-
ticipation in government . . . [since] the quality of the public ex-
change of ideas promoted by the marketplace advances the quality of 
democratic government.”44  The values underlying the marketplace of 
ideas theory of the First Amendment have been cited by the Court in 
 
Court’s recent application of less than strict scrutiny to disclosure requirements imposed 
on political speech, a form of speech that is at the core of the First Amendment’s protec-
tions, suggests that some of Riley’s language goes too far.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 
S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010) (“[D]isclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more comprehen-
sive regulations of speech.”). 
 43 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”). 
 44 Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas:  A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 3–4 (1984). 
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a wide variety of opinions,45 making clear that “more speech and a 
better informed citizenry are among the central goals of the Free 
Speech Clause.”46  As Justice Kennedy recently observed in his plurali-
ty opinion in United States v. Alvarez,47 the marketplace of ideas theory 
of the First Amendment dictates that “[t]he remedy for speech that is 
false is speech that is true.”48  When false speech is injected into the 
marketplace of ideas, robust debate will ensure that the truth will ul-
timately prevail. 
Under this theory, factual disclosure laws, which inject more in-
formation in the marketplace of ideas, further First Amendment 
goals.49  In fact, “it is often the very purpose of ‘compelled speech’ re-
quirements to correct market flaws in the ‘marketplace of ideas’ and 
further the First Amendment’s goal of maximizing communication 
and discovery of truth.”50  Compelled speech requirements merely 
enhance the information that is being circulated, thus contributing 
to and improving the marketplace of ideas by providing citizens with 
more information than would otherwise be available. 
A related theory of the First Amendment focuses on the Amend-
ment’s ultimate goal:  a better informed citizenry that can make wise 
voting decisions, thus ensuring the success of democratic self-
government.  Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, who focused on the 
 
 45 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012) (plurality opinion) (de-
scribing Justice Holmes’ quote from Abrams as “the theory of our Constitution,” and con-
cluding that our “[s]ociety has the right and civic duty to engage in open, dynamic, ra-
tional discourse”); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (“Our precedents have 
focused not only on the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-
expression but also on its role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and 
the dissemination of information and ideas.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Citi-
zens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) (“The Court has 
long viewed the First Amendment as protecting a marketplace for the clash of different 
views and conflicting ideas.  That concept has been stated and restated almost since the 
Constitution was drafted.”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is 
the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in 
which truth will ultimately prevail . . . .”). 
 46 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 47 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 48 Id. at 2550. 
 49 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there be 
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the 
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”). 
 50 Ogden, supra note 40, at 370. But see Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech 
Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 333 (2008) (arguing that compelled speech means the gov-
ernment “artificially amplifies its own message through the mouths of unwilling citizens, 
giving listeners a mix of information skewed to the government viewpoint” and thus dis-
torts the marketplace of ideas). 
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social values served by free speech, championed the “democratic self-
government” theory of the First Amendment.  In his view: 
Legislation which abridges . . . freedom [of speech] is forbidden, but not 
legislation to enlarge and enrich it.  The freedom of mind which befits 
the members of a self-governing society is not a given and fixed part of 
human nature.  It can be increased and established by learning, by teach-
ing, by the unhindered flow of accurate information . . . .  And the feder-
al legislature is not forbidden to engage in that positive enterprise of cul-
tivating the general intelligence upon which the success of self-
government so obviously depends.51 
For Meiklejohn, and other proponents of the democratic self-
government theory, “the ‘best’ decisions can only be reached in a 
democracy if the citizenry is fully aware of the issues involved, the op-
tions available, and the interests or values affected.”52  As a conse-
quence, this theory of the First Amendment focuses “on the rights of 
citizens to receive information, rather than on the rights of speakers 
to express themselves.”53 
Just as compelled factual disclosures contribute to the market-
place of ideas and the search for truth, compelled disclosures also 
further the goal of democratic self-government.  Since an unin-
formed citizenry poses a risk to citizenship and participation in a de-
liberative democracy, compelled factual disclosures further First 
Amendment goals.  As Professor Cass Sunstein argues, “[w]ithout bet-
ter information, neither deliberation nor democracy is possible.  Le-
gal reforms designed to remedy the situation are a precondition for 
democratic politics.”54  Such reforms are particularly necessary when 
there is a market failure in the provision of information, demonstrat-
ing that citizens will remain uninformed unless the government in-
tervenes.  Since information is a public good with non-rival consump-
tion, “private incentives lead to the dissemination of too little 
information.”55  In particular, information about risk and harm is of-
ten underproduced, necessitating some type of government interven-
 
 51 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 16–17 
(1948); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1948) (“What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but 
that everything worth saying shall be said.”). 
 52 Ingber, supra note 44, at 9. 
 53 Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13 (2000) 
[hereinafter Post, The Constitutional Status of Commerical Speech].  
 54 Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America:  Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 653, 658 (1993). 
 55 FUNG ET AL., supra note 1, at 31. 
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tion to require its disclosure if the public is to be adequately in-
formed.56 
B. Autonomy Interests 
If the First Amendment were only governed by the marketplace of 
ideas and democratic self-governance theories, non-commercial 
speakers might also be compelled to speak in ways that enhance the 
informational value of their speech.  After all, one could argue that 
the marketplace and democratic self-governance would be benefited 
if the government required factual disclosures that improved the 
quality of all speech, even ideological or political speech.  The im-
portant distinction, however, is that the First Amendment also pro-
vides robust protection for the autonomy interests of non-commercial 
speakers.  As the Court articulated in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Les-
bian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,57 the First Amendment protects 
against compelling speech in public discourse because of the “fun-
damental rule . . . that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the con-
tent of his own message.”58  If the state were to impose its view of what 
qualifies as “the truth” on religious or political speech, this would 
undermine democratic legitimation.59  We tolerate false ideas in the 
public discourse because the First Amendment protects the right of 
self-expression:  “Such falsehoods are tolerated because we are freer 
as a society when individuals are permitted to engage in unhindered 
self-expression.”60  Freedom of speech entails more than just increas-
ing the amount of true information in the marketplace; freedom of 
speech also secures the rights of individuals to express their own be-
liefs, no matter their truth, without fear of government censorship.  
The Court has made clear that at the “‘heart of the First Amendment 
 
 56 See id. at 6 (“A generation of research by economists and political scientists has shown that 
markets and deliberative processes do not automatically produce all the information 
people need to make informed choices among goods and services.  When hidden risks or 
service flaws create serious problems for the public at large, the government can help re-
duce those risks or improve services by stepping in to require the disclosure of missing in-
formation.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 54, at 656 (“[T]here is frequently a market fail-
ure in the provision of information.  At least as a presumptive matter, government 
remedies are an appropriate response.  These remedies should ordinarily take the form 
of governmentally provided information, education campaigns, or disclosure require-
ments imposed on private firms.”). 
 57 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 58 Id. at 573. 
 59 See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59 (2012) [herein-
after POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM]. 
 60 Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223, 257 
(1990). 
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[is the] notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, 
and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind 
and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.’”61  Thus, com-
pelling speakers to include even purely factual information in their 
non-commercial speech threatens the speaker’s constitutionally pro-
tected autonomy interests. 
In contrast, the First Amendment provides minimal protection for 
the autonomy interests of a speaker who is engaged in commercial 
speech.  Such speakers do not engage in a form of self-expression 
when they provide the public with information about their products 
and services.  “Since the advertiser is not engaged in an expression of 
its views or any other revelation of its personality, forcing the adver-
tisement to carry a message not its own does not violate the integrity 
of the expressive, thinking self as did the regulations struck down in 
Barnette, and Wooley.”62  The First Amendment protects commercial 
speech because of its informational value to consumers, not because 
the commercial speaker has a right to promote his products in what-
ever manner he sees fit.  “[W]hereas ordinary First Amendment doc-
trine preserves the freedom of a speaker to participate in public dis-
course in the manner of her choosing, commercial speech doctrine 
focuses instead on preserving the flow of commercial information to 
the public.”63  The Court’s most recent application of Zauderer illus-
trates this distinction:  in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States,64 
the plaintiff objected to the disclosure requirements of the Bankrupt-
cy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act.  In rejecting the 
plaintiff’s challenge to the Act’s requirement that advertisements for 
bankruptcy assistance include the term “debt relief agency,” the 
Court characterized its argument that the term was confusing as 
“amount[ing] to little more than [the plaintiff’s] preference . . . for 
referring to itself as something other than a ‘debt relief agen-
cy’ . . . . [T]his preference lacks any constitutional basis.”65  Given that 
the Act only restricted the plaintiff’s commercial speech, it lacked any 
autonomy interest in defining itself by some other label. 
 
 61 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 472 (1997) (quoting Abood v. 
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977)). 
 62 Estreicher, supra note 60, at 271 n.200 (citations omitted). 
 63 Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion:  A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician 
Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 975 (2007) [hereinafter Post, Informed Consent to Abortion]; 
see also Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 27 (“Disclosure 
requirements are permissible within the domain of commercial speech, however, because 
the autonomy of speakers is not at stake, only the conveyance of information.”). 
 64 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010). 
 65 Id. at 1340. 
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C. Applying First Amendment Theories to Compelled Commercial Speech 
The Court has drawn on the marketplace of ideas and democratic 
self-government theories of the First Amendment in extending the 
Amendment’s protection to commercial speech.  In Virginia Pharma-
cy, the Court described “free flow of information,” even information 
on commercial subjects, as serving the First Amendment’s goal of 
“enlighten[ed] public decisionmaking in a democracy.”66  Dean Rob-
ert Post has described the Court’s analysis in Virginia Pharmacy as 
“closely track[ing] Meiklejohn’s analysis”67 of the societal values 
served by free speech:  “The Court has been quite explicit that com-
mercial speech should be constitutionally protected so as to safe-
guard the circulation of information.”68  And the Court continues to 
justify the First Amendment’s protection for commercial speech 
based on the audience’s informational interests.69 
Since commercial speech is protected mainly for its informational 
function, compelled factual disclosures that merely enhance the 
amount and quality of information being circulated align with the 
reason commercial speech is protected at all.  “[B]ecause commercial 
speech is not protected in order to promote democratic legitimation, 
but instead to serve democratic competence, it is constitutionally 
permissible to compel commercial speech.  Such compulsion can 
augment the flow of accurate information to the public and so actual-
ly advance the constitutional purpose of public education.”70  The 
Court was quite explicit that this was its rationale in upholding Zau-
derer’s disclosure requirement, reasoning that since protection of 
commercial speech is “justified principally by the value to consumers 
of the information such speech provides,” Zauderer’s First Amend-
ment interest “in not providing any particular factual information in 
 
 66 Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). 
 67 Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 14. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340–41 (upholding a commercial speech disclosure law that 
“provides interested observers with pertinent information about the advertiser’s services 
and client obligations”); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 766 (1993) (“First Amendment 
coverage of commercial speech is designed to safeguard” society’s “interests in broad ac-
cess to complete and accurate commercial information . . . .”); First Nat’l Bank of Boston 
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (noting that commercial advertisement is protected 
“because it furthers the societal interest in the free flow of commercial information” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) 
(noting that commercial “speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring in-
formed and reliable decisionmaking”). 
 70 POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 59, at 42 (footnote 
omitted). 
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his advertising is minimal.”71  The compelled disclosure had minimal 
impact on Zauderer’s autonomy72—the regulation merely required 
him to provide additional factual information that he otherwise 
would not have disclosed. 
III.  THE SCOPE OF THE STATE INTERESTS JUSTIFYING COMMERCIAL 
DISCLOSURE LAWS 
Zauderer’s language is unclear whether its rational basis test applies 
if the state’s interest in mandating the commercial disclosure is some-
thing other than curing consumer deception.  The Court’s explicit 
holding is as follows:  “[W]e hold that an advertiser’s rights are ade-
quately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably 
related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consum-
ers.”73  While this language could be read as limiting the scope of 
state interests justifying commercial disclosure laws,74 the Court may 
have simply been recognizing that the state’s purpose in enacting the 
law at issue in Zauderer was to cure consumer deception.  The Court’s 
later applications of Zauderer have not clarified the confusion over 
what types of interests can justify compelled commercial speech.  In 
the 2010 case Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz,75 the Court upheld a com-
mercial disclosure law under Zauderer, but since the law’s purpose was 
also to cure consumer deception, there was no need for the Court to 
address whether other types of state interests can justify compelled 
commercial disclosures.76 
However, a close reading of Zauderer suggests that compelled 
commercial speech should be subject to rational basis scrutiny even if 
other interests motivated the state regulation.  The Court’s lack of 
any extensive discussion of Central Hudson’s more restrictive test sug-
 
 71 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 72 See, e.g., Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets:  Compelled Commercial Speech and Co-
erced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 
562 (2006) [hereinafter Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets] (“The Court would surely 
not characterize as ‘minimal’ the constitutional interests of participants in public dis-
course, like the New York Times, to refuse to publish accurate factual information to sup-
plement what the government might regard as a potentially misleading editorial.”). 
 73 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (footnote omitted). 
 74 See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 491 (1997) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“Zauderer carries no authority for a mandate unrelated to the interest in 
avoiding misleading or incomplete commercial messages.”). 
 75 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1340–41 (2010). 
 76 See also United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 416 (2001) (distinguishing Zau-
derer on the grounds that Zauderer’s disclosure was required to cure consumer deception, 
but not holding that this is the only state interest justifying compelled disclosures). 
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gests that its rationale for applying lesser scrutiny to compelled com-
mercial speech lay in the difference between compelling additional 
factual speech and restricting speech, not on the particular state in-
terest motivating the disclosure under consideration.  Importantly, 
under Central Hudson, misleading commercial speech can be banned 
by the state—such speech is not even protected by the First Amend-
ment, and Central Hudson’s requirements consequently do not apply.77  
Given the Zauderer Court’s conclusion that the attorney advertise-
ments were deceptive and misleading because of their omission of 
any information about the client’s liability for costs, the Court could 
have simply concluded that since deceptive commercial speech is not 
even protected under Central Hudson, the state could compel addi-
tional factual speech that cures this deception without violating the 
First Amendment.  If the key consideration justifying the application 
of rational basis scrutiny was the misleading nature of the underlying 
speech, the Court surely would have mentioned Central Hudson’s 
holding that misleading commercial speech lies outside the First 
Amendment. 
The Court did not take this route—instead, the Court focuses on 
the “material differences between disclosure requirements and out-
right prohibitions on speech.”78  The Court notes its strong prefer-
ence for disclosure laws as a general method of regulating commer-
cial speech:  “[A]ll our discussions of restraints on commercial 
speech have recommended disclosure requirements as one of the ac-
ceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual suppression of speech.”79  
And the Court rejects Zauderer’s argument that compelled commer-
cial speech should be subject to a “least restrictive means” test under 
Central Hudson “[b]ecause the First Amendment interests implicated 
by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at 
stake when speech is actually suppressed.”80  The reason that Central 
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny did not apply was not because the par-
ticular speech at issue was misleading and deceptive—it was because 
the state was compelling the inclusion of additional, factual infor-
mation in commercial speech, and “appellant’s constitutionally pro-
tected interest in not providing any particular factual information in 
his advertising is minimal.”81  Dean Post has also read Zauderer as con-
doning disclosure policies serving a wider range of state interests, 
 
 77 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980). 
 78 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650. 
 79 Id. at 651 n.14. 
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. at 651. 
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noting that the Court does not minimize a commercial speaker’s First 
Amendment interests because of the state’s “powerful interest in 
averting potential deception.  Instead [the Court] held that because 
the constitutional value of commercial speech lies in the circulation 
of information, commercial speakers do not possess more than resid-
ual interests in deciding what kinds of advertisements to promul-
gate.”82 
If we look to the Court’s analysis of regulations that restrict com-
mercial speech, rather than simply compelling disclosures, the Court 
has made clear that other valid interests justify restrictions on com-
mercial speech.83  As just a few examples, the Court has recognized 
the state’s interest in protecting the reputation of attorneys,84 dis-
couraging participation in lotteries,85 and reducing alcoholism by 
preventing strength wars between alcohol producers86 as valid state 
interests under Central Hudson.  Thus, while prevention of commer-
cial harm may be “the typical reason why commercial speech can be 
subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial 
speech,”87 it is not the only reason.  And if commercial speech can be 
restricted for purposes other than the prevention of consumer decep-
tion and confusion, it would make little sense to limit the state’s in-
terests when the form of regulation raises fewer First Amendment 
concerns. 
Rather than listing the various ultimate goals besides curing con-
sumer deception that should qualify for rational basis review, the test 
can in fact be reduced to a much simpler inquiry into the state’s im-
mediate purpose in compelling the speech.  Whether the state’s ulti-
mate goal is to encourage healthier eating habits or to discourage use 
of a dangerous product, if the state’s immediate purpose is to inform 
consumers, the disclosure law furthers the goals of the commercial 
speech doctrine by increasing consumers’ access to information 
without offending the speaker’s autonomy interests.  Accordingly, 
 
 82 Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets, supra note 72, at 577; see also Jennifer L. Pomeranz, 
Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine:  The Case of Menu Label Laws, 12 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 159, 178 (2009) (arguing that a narrow reading of Zauderer as 
permitting only disclosure laws that serve the state’s interest in curing deception is both 
“incorrect” and “unfeasible”). 
 83 Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of So-
cial Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 784 (1999) (“The Central Hudson standard . . . does 
not limit the justifications for restrictions on commercial speech to the prevention of de-
ception.”). 
 84 Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). 
 85 United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 437 (1993). 
 86 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995). 
 87 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993). 
Nov. 2012] COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH 559 
 
Zauderer’s rational basis scrutiny should apply whenever the state 
compels commercial disclosures that serve the state’s interest in an 
informed public. 
A. Lower Court Interpretations of the State’s Interest in Compelling 
Commercial Speech 
In fact, both the Second and First Circuits have read Zauderer as 
permitting compelled commercial speech that serves interests other 
than curing consumer deception.  In Pharmaceutical Care Management 
Ass’n v. Rowe,88 the First Circuit applied Zauderer to Maine’s require-
ment that middlemen in the distribution of pharmaceuticals disclose 
information about their finances and business practices to the state, 
rejecting the argument that Zauderer is limited to curing deceptive 
commercial advertising.89  And in National Electrical Manufacturers 
Ass’n v. Sorrell,90 the Second Circuit held that commercial disclosure 
laws satisfy the First Amendment as long as there is a “rational con-
nection between the purpose of a commercial disclosure requirement 
and the means employed to realize that purpose.”91  Since Sorrell pro-
vides a thorough analysis of the reason for permitting disclosures that 
serve other state interests, it is worth considering this decision in 
some detail. 
In Sorrell, the Second Circuit evaluated a Vermont law requiring 
producers of products containing mercury to label their products to 
inform consumers that the products contained mercury and should 
be recycled or disposed of as hazardous waste, in accordance with a 
separate Vermont statute requiring these products to be recycled or 
disposed of as such.92  The court recognized that the disclosure law 
“was not intended to prevent consumer confusion or deception per 
se, but rather to better inform consumers about the products they 
purchase.”93  But the court concluded that Zauderer’s rational basis 
test still applied:  “Vermont’s interest in protecting human health and 
the environment from mercury poisoning [was] a legitimate and sig-
nificant public goal,”94 that was reasonably related to the state’s dis-
closure requirement. 
 
 88 429 F.3d 294 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 89 Id. at 310 n.8. 
 90 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 91 Id. at 115. 
 92 Id. at 107 n.1. 
 93 Id. at 115 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 94 Id. 
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The Second Circuit’s rationale for reading Zauderer broadly was 
tied to its recognition of the First Amendment interests at stake: 
Commercial disclosure requirements are treated differently from re-
strictions on commercial speech because mandated disclosure of accu-
rate, factual, commercial information does not offend the core First 
Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of information or 
protecting individual liberty interests.  Such disclosure furthers, rather 
than hinders, the First Amendment goal of the discovery of truth and 
contributes to the efficiency of the “marketplace of ideas.”  Protection of 
the robust and free flow of accurate information is the principal First 
Amendment justification for protecting commercial speech, and requir-
ing disclosure of truthful information promotes that goal.  In such a case, 
then, less exacting scrutiny is required than where truthful, nonmislead-
ing commercial speech is restricted.95 
The court recognized that Zauderer’s reduced level of scrutiny had 
little to do with the particular state interest served by the disclosure at 
issue in that case.  Instead, the rationale was much broader:  mandat-
ed factual information increases the amount of accurate information 
circulated in the marketplace, without offending any autonomy in-
terests. 
When the Second Circuit was subsequently confronted with a 
challenge to New York City’s law requiring certain restaurants to dis-
close on their menu and menu boards the number of calories in each 
dish, the court reiterated the validity of Sorrell’s broad reading of the 
state interests justifying compelled commercial speech.  The court 
upheld New York City’s menu-labeling regime, recognizing the ap-
plicability of Zauderer given the state’s compelling interest in combat-
ting the public health crisis of obesity.96  The Second Circuit’s deci-
sion in New York State Restaurant Ass’n v. New York City Board of Health 
further illustrates the rationale behind extending Zauderer to laws that 
serve valid state purposes beyond curing consumer deception. 
The clear ultimate goal of New York City’s menu disclosure law 
was to promote public health.  The City’s Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene described the law’s purpose as permitting “individu-
als to make more informed choices that can decrease their risk for 
the negative health effects of overweight and obesity associated with 
excessive calorie intake.”97  The evidence relied upon by the City in 
New York Restaurant Ass’n demonstrated that 54% of the City’s adults 
 
 95 Id. at 113–14 (footnote omitted). 
 96 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 136 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 97 DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF AN 
AMENDMENT (§ 81.50) TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH CODE (Dec. 5, 
2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-
adoption-hc-art81-50.pdf. 
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and 43% of the City’s elementary school children were either over-
weight or obese, and that obesity was a contributing factor to the dis-
eases that caused 70% of deaths in New York City in 2005.98  The evi-
dence also demonstrated that individuals often consume an excess of 
calories when dining outside the home, and that excess calorie con-
sumption was the main cause of the obesity epidemic.99 
In upholding New York City’s law, the Second Circuit rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument that Zauderer should be limited to disclosure re-
quirements that cure deceptive and misleading speech.100  Reaffirm-
ing the validity of Sorrell,101 the court reiterated “that Zauderer’s hold-
ing was broad enough to encompass nonmisleading disclosure 
requirements.”102  In so doing, the court rejected the argument that 
the Supreme Court’s post-Sorrell decision in United States v. United 
Foods, Inc.103 had in any way limited the types of disclosure laws subject 
to rational basis review under Zauderer.  The Second Circuit conclud-
ed that United Foods had merely “distinguishe[d] Zauderer on the basis 
that the compelled speech in Zauderer was necessary to prevent de-
ception of consumers; it does not provide that all other disclosure re-
quirements are subject to heightened scrutiny.”104  The court also re-
jected the plaintiff’s argument that more recent Supreme Court 
decisions recognizing the general value of commercial speech meant 
that Central Hudson’s test, rather than rational basis scrutiny under 
Zauderer, should be applied to compelled commercial speech regula-
tions.105 
In explaining why commercial disclosure requirements are subject 
to lesser scrutiny, the court quoted extensively from Sorrell’s recogni-
tion of the pertinent First Amendment values at stake.  The court 
made clear that “laws mandating factual disclosures are subject to the 
 
 98 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 134–35. 
 99 Id. at 135. 
100 During the litigation, the city asserted that it had two purposes for enacting the law:  “(1) 
[to] reduce consumer confusion and deception; and (2) to promote informed consumer 
decision-making so as to reduce obesity and the diseases associated with it.”  Id. at 134.  
The court, however, did not address this first purpose in light of its holding that the city’s 
public health rationale provided sufficient justification for the law.  See id. at 133 n.21.  
The city’s attempted re-characterization of its interest as reducing deception and confu-
sion for the purposes of the litigation shows how many disclosure laws can fit within a 
narrow reading of Zauderer, even though the real state interest is broader than curing de-
ception. 
101 Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001). 
102 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 133. 
103 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
104 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 133. 
105 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 45–46, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114 (No. 08-1892-
cv). 
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rational basis test even if they address non-deceptive speech.”106  Giv-
en the findings that consumers would be able to make more in-
formed and healthier food choices if given calorie information, the 
court concluded that the City’s menu disclosure law was “clearly rea-
sonably related to its goal of reducing obesity.”107 
The D.C. Circuit, however, has taken the contrary view.  The D.C. 
Circuit recently adopted a restricted view of the breadth of state in-
terests justifying commercial disclosures, holding that Zauderer’s ra-
tional basis test is in fact limited to disclosure laws curing consumer 
deception.108  The majority reasons that Zauderer does not provide any 
explicit authority for disclosures serving other state interests, and that 
subsequent Supreme Court cases have not endorsed broader applica-
tions of Zauderer’s rational basis review.109  In contrast to the Second 
Circuit’s extensive analysis of the First Amendment values implicated 
by commercial disclosures, the D.C. Circuit’s majority opinion pro-
vides no First Amendment rationale for limiting Zauderer’s holding to 
laws curing consumer deception.  Moreover, the D.C. Circuit is the 
only circuit that has adopted such a narrow view of Zauderer’s applica-
bility.110 
The Supreme Court has yet to address whether commercial dis-
closure laws serving state interests other than curing consumer de-
ception should be subject to rational basis review.  Given the circuit 
split, the Court may very well address this question in the near future.  
The Second Circuit’s reasoning111 on this point demonstrates the lack 
of any First Amendment rationale for limiting Zauderer to laws curing 
consumer deception, and the importance of recognizing other valid 
state interests justifying compelled commercial speech.112  As long as 
the state has a substantial interest in informing the public, rational 
 
106 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 133 n.21. 
107 Id. at 136. 
108 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063, 2012 WL 3632003, at *5–6 
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 2012). 
109 Id. 
110 In addition, it is worth noting that Judge Rogers questions the majority’s analysis on this 
point in her dissent, noting that “[a]s other circuits have recognized, in Zauderer the Su-
preme Court appears simply to have held that a government interest in protecting con-
sumers from possible deception is sufficient to support a disclosure requirement—not that 
this particular interest is necessary to support such a requirement.”  Id. at *16 n.6 (Rogers, 
J., dissenting).  Judge Rogers ultimately does not reach a conclusion on this point, as she 
finds that the law at issue cures consumer deception and confusion.  Id. 
111 It is worth noting that Justice Sotomayor was on the Second Circuit panel in both Sorrell 
and New York State Restaurant Ass’n before her elevation to the Supreme Court. 
112 For instance, looking to N.Y. State Restaurant Ass’n, the state’s important efforts to combat 
a serious public health crisis would have been subject to a higher level of scrutiny if Zau-
derer were limited to disclosures curing deception and confusion. 
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basis scrutiny should apply, regardless of whether the state’s ultimate 
goal is to cure deception, to promote public health, or to protect the 
environment. 
B. The Prevalence of Disclosures Serving the State’s Interest in an Informed 
Public 
If Zauderer were limited to disclosure laws curing consumer decep-
tion and confusion, a wide variety of disclosure policies would be sub-
ject to searching judicial review.  Innumerable laws and regulations 
compel commercial disclosures for reasons other than curing decep-
tion.113  And given the current support for information disclosure pol-
icies as an important regulatory tool to improve decision-making,114 
the number of such laws is very likely to increase.  Thus, while there 
are arguments based on case law that support a broad reading of the 
state interests justifying compelled disclosures, there is also an inde-
pendent policy argument supporting this interpretation. 
The government mandates commercial disclosures that serve a 
wide range of interests other than curing consumer deception.  The-
se laws serve the state’s interest in protecting the environment, pro-
moting public health, and reducing safety risks posed by hazardous 
products and behaviors, to name just a few of the most common goals 
motivating compelled disclosures.  Packaged food products must in-
clude nutritional data115 and information about the presence of 
common allergens,116 hazardous substances must be labeled with their 
safety risks,117 tobacco products and advertisements must be labeled 
with health risks,118 appliances must be labeled with their energy con-
sumption levels,119 pesticides must be labeled with their ingredients 
and directions for proper use,120 alcoholic beverages must be labeled 
with information about safety and health risks,121 restaurants must dis-
 
113 See Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets, supra note 72, at 584 (“[C]ommercial speech is 
routinely and pervasively compelled for reasons that have little to do with the prevention 
of deception.”). 
114 See Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 § 4 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
115 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2006) (requiring label to list the calories, calories from fat, total fat, 
cholesterol, sodium, carbohydrates, and sugars in a single serving of the food product). 
116 Id. at § 343(w). 
117 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p) (2006). 
118 76 Fed. Reg. 36628–29 (June 22, 2011). 
119 16 C.F.R. § 305.11 (2011). 
120 40 C.F.R. § 156.10 (2011). 
121 27 U.S.C. § 215 (2006). 
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close the calories in menu items,122 new cars must be labeled with 
their estimated mileage per gallon123 and the car’s risk-rating for roll-
ing over in a crash,124 children’s toys must be labeled with the toy’s 
appropriate age-group for use,125 and restaurants in some cities must 
be labeled with their health inspection grades.126  As perhaps the most 
prominent example, our entire system of securities regulation is 
based on disclosure laws.127  Are consumers confused and deceived if 
they buy a car without knowing its safety ratings, or eat at a restaurant 
without knowing how it performed in its latest health inspection?128 
What all of these disclosure policies have in common is that they 
are all motivated by the state’s interest in a more informed public.  
The state’s immediate purpose in enacting these policies is to inform 
consumers, with the hopes that consumers will use the information to 
make more informed decisions that will promote the state’s broader 
goals.  Given that the rationale for Zauderer’s reduced scrutiny is that 
First Amendment values are served by increasing consumers’ access 
to commercial information, disclosure policies that are motivated by 
 
122 See Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, Nutrition Labeling in Chain Restaurants:  State and Local 
Laws/Bills/Regulations:  2009–2010, CSPI.ORG (Feb. 16, 2010), http://cspinet.org/
new/pdf/ml_bill_summaries_09.pdf (listing state and local menu labeling laws as of 
2009–2010); see also Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, State and Local Menu Labeling Policies, 
CSPI.ORG (Apr. 2011), http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/ml_map.pdf (displaying map show-
ing the implementation status of menu labeling laws across the country).  As part of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, menu-labeling requirements will soon be 
imposed across the country.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  This Act 
requires all restaurant chains with twenty or more locations doing business under the 
same name to disclose the number of calories in regular menu items on the restaurant’s 
menu board and written menus.  The law also requires the affected restaurants to in-
clude, on their menu or menu boards, a “succinct statement concerning suggested daily 
caloric intake” that is “designed to enable the public to understand, in the context of a 
total daily diet, the significance of the caloric information that is provided on the menu.”  
Id. 
123 16 C.F.R. § 259.1 (2011). 
124 Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 12, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 49 U.S.C. (2006)). 
125 16 C.F.R. § 1501.2(b) (2011). 
126 See 24 R.N.Y.C. § 23-03 (2010); see also Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech:  Jo-
hanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 214 n.97 (2005) [here-
inafter Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech] (listing a variety of consumer labeling re-
quirements enforced by the Federal Trade Commission). 
127 NICHOLAS WOLFSON, CORPORATE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE SEC 28–29 (1990) 
(noting that Zauderer’s distinction between bans on speech and mandatory disclosures 
“serves as a basis for the mandatory disclosure system of the SEC.  The structure of securi-
ties regulation relies heavily on required disclosure in the sale of securities, shareholder 
meetings, and takeover transactions”). 
128 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 1, at 12–13 (listing different disclosure laws and their purpos-
es). 
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the state’s interest in an informed public, regardless of the further 
goals the disclosure policy is designed to achieve, should fall within 
the doctrine. 
It is worth considering the policy implications that would result if 
Central Hudson’s intermediate level of scrutiny applied to these types 
of compelled speech policies rather than Zauderer’s rational basis test.  
There is no guarantee that these disclosure policies would meet Cen-
tral Hudson’s requirement that the regulation directly advance the 
state interest and be no more extensive than necessary.  The Central 
Hudson test has been widely criticized for being difficult to apply in a 
consistent and predictable manner, with a significant divergence of 
opinion as to how much protection the test affords to commercial 
speech.129  Given the widespread acceptance of compelled risk label-
ing as an appropriate regulatory strategy,130 there are strong policy ar-
guments for interpreting Zauderer broadly to recognize the validity of 
other state interests. 
Looking, for example, to compelled speech requirements that 
serve the state’s interest in informing the public in order to promote 
public health and safety, it is largely assumed that the wide range of 
disclosures serving this substantial state goal do not violate the First 
Amendment.131  And given the Court’s recognition that the govern-
ment “has a significant interest in protecting the health, safety, and 
 
129 See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 
627, 630–31 (1990) (“[J]udges and Justices have filled quite a bit of space in the case re-
porters trying to figure out precisely what forms of regulation the [Central Hudson] test 
permits. . . . [T]he cases have been able to shed little light on Central Hudson, aside from 
standing as ad hoc subject-specific examples of what is permissible and what is not.”); 
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 42 (“The bland, gener-
ic quality of [the Central Hudson test elements] is unconnected to any particular First 
Amendment theory, which is no doubt why they have proved susceptible to such wide 
swings of application.”). 
130 See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 651 (7th Cir. 2006) (listing prod-
uct warnings and nutritional informational labels as the “most prominent examples” of 
constitutionally permissible compelled speech). 
131 Estreicher, supra note 60, at 272 (“Even where there is no history of misleading adver-
tisements, the state may compel advertisers to warn that their products’ intended uses 
pose dangers to public health or safety.  This is routine in the case of poisons and haz-
ardous chemicals.  The state has a compelling interest in ensuring that the public is aware 
of the known dangers attendant to the lawful decisions the advertising seeks to promote.” 
(footnote omitted)).  Despite this assumption, the Court has never actually addressed this 
issue.  See Wendy E. Parmet & Jason A. Smith, Free Speech and Public Health:  A Population-
Based Approach to the First Amendment, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 363, 423 (2006) (“Although 
both the common law and state and federal regulations have long compelled warnings 
and disclosures, the Supreme Court has never squarely considered whether or when such 
public health mandates violate the First Amendment.”). 
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welfare of its citizens”132 that may justify commercial speech regula-
tions,133 there seems little rationale for limiting Zauderer to disclosure 
laws that cure consumer deception.  If Zauderer were limited in this 
way, widely accepted disclosure policies like mandated nutrition la-
beling of packaged foods would be subject to Central Hudson’s re-
quirement that the speech required be no more extensive than nec-
essary.  Nutrition panel labeling, which has been mandated since 
1990,134 serves the state’s important interest in informing the public in 
order to protect health135—an interest that is equally, if not more im-
portant, than the state’s interest in curing deceptive or misleading 
commercial speech.  Mandated nutrition labels provide just one ex-
ample of the type of compelled commercial speech serving the state’s 
public health goals that would be subject to searching judicial review 
were Zauderer’s rational basis test inapplicable. 
C. Limitations on the State’s Interest 
Recognizing that rational basis scrutiny should apply to disclosure 
policies that serve the state’s interest in an informed public does not 
mean, however, that all informational disclosures applied to com-
mercial speech are per se legitimate under the First Amendment.  
First, Zauderer itself explicitly cautions that “unjustified or unduly 
burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First 
 
132 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995). 
133 See also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001) (recognizing the state’s 
substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use in applying the Central Hudson 
test). 
134 In 1990, Congress enacted the first comprehensive food labeling law, the Nutrition Label-
ing and Education Act, which requires the labels on packaged food products to contain 
detailed information about the item’s nutritional content.  Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 2, 104 
Stat. 2353 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  See, e.g., 21 
U.S.C. § 343(q) (2006) (requiring label to list the calories, calories from fat, total fat, cho-
lesterol, sodium, carbohydrates, and sugars in a single serving of the food product). 
135 H.R. Rep. 101-538, at 9–10 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3336, 3339 (“The Sur-
geon General has advised Americans that diets low in fats, low in salt and high in fiber 
can reduce the risk of chronic diseases such as cancer and heart disease. . . . [S]tatements 
regarding the level of these nutrients in foods will assist Americans in following the Sur-
geon General’s guidelines.”); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2396 (Jan. 6, 1993) (“Standardiz-
ing the nutrition information that appears in food labeling, including nutrient content 
claims, will make it easier for consumers to find, understand, and compare the infor-
mation they need to make healthy eating choices.”).  The Act’s inclusion of a provision 
permitting the Secretary of the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to mandate the 
inclusion of additional nutritional information that is not otherwise specified in the Act if 
he determines that such information will “assist consumers in maintaining healthy dietary 
practices,” 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(2)(A), further illustrates the underlying public health 
goals. 
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Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech.”136  Thus, if 
the disclosure requirement is so extensive that it serves to restrict or 
chill the speaker’s ability to engage in commercial speech, such a dis-
closure interferes with the speaker’s First Amendment rights.  Se-
cond, in order for Zauderer to apply, the state must have an interest in 
providing the public with more information germane to the particu-
lar commercial speech at issue:  there must be a legitimate nexus be-
tween the information compelled and the commercial speech.137  The 
state could not, for example, require all packaged food products to 
bear the warning “smoking causes cancer,” because such a disclosure 
bears no legitimate nexus to the food products being sold.  And the 
third limitation on Zauderer requires that the state have an actual in-
terest in informing the public—there must be some legitimate reason 
why the compelled information is of value to consumers.  For in-
stance, if the state were to compel all toys to have a label displaying 
the names of the individuals who designed the toy, with absolutely no 
rationale for why that information was of interest or value to consum-
ers, such a disclosure would not serve the state’s interest in an in-
formed public. 
This third limitation is similar to the reading of Zauderer adopted 
by the Second Circuit, which while applying rational basis scrutiny to 
disclosures motivated by purposes beyond curing deception, does not 
apply rational basis review to a commercial disclosure law whose sole 
purpose is to gratify “consumer curiosity.”  In International Dairy Foods 
Ass’n v. Amestoy,138 the Second Circuit applied Central Hudson to Ver-
mont’s law compelling dairy manufacturers to disclose whether their 
products were derived from herds treated with recombinant Bovine 
Somatotropin (“rBST”).  Importantly, Vermont took no position on 
whether rBST had any health effects, and justified the law solely on 
the grounds that some consumers were interested in learning wheth-
er rBST had been used.  The panel majority struck down the law, 
concluding that “consumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough 
state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual 
 
136 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
137 Although Zauderer does not make this limitation explicit, the Court’s analysis is tied to the 
commercial speaker’s lack of autonomy interest in not providing accurate information 
about his particular products and services.  See id. at 651 n.14 (“The right of a commercial 
speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his services is not . . . a fundamental 
right.” (emphasis added)).  A commercial speaker does, however, have an autonomy in-
terest in not being required to provide information, even if purely factual, about some-
thing that is irrelevant to the speaker’s commercial endeavors. 
138 92 F.3d 67, 72–74 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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statement.”139  While the panel majority’s analysis in International Dairy 
Foods can be criticized for failing to recognize the ways in which the 
disclosure at issue was relevant to both public health and ethical con-
cerns about the hormone’s effect on cows,140 subsequent cases have 
made clear that its holding is confined to disclosure laws whose sole 
purpose is to satisfy consumer curiosity.  In New York State Restaurant 
Ass’n, the Second Circuit reiterated that International Dairy Foods’ use 
of Central Hudson is “expressly limited to cases in which a state disclo-
sure requirement is supported by no other interest other than the 
gratification of ‘consumer curiosity.’”141 
Thus, the Second Circuit’s subsequent reading of Amestoy supports 
the conclusion that a compelled speech law that fails to convey in-
formation of any worth does not serve the commercial speech doc-
trine’s goal of furthering consumers’ informational interests and 
should not be subject to rational basis review.  The state’s interest in 
an informed public must be tied to some sort of ultimate goal that 
the information will serve:  to encourage healthier eating habits, to 
increase consumers’ knowledge of a product’s safety risks, to protect 
against deception, or another motivation for the disclosure that goes 
beyond mere satisfaction of curiosity. 
Moreover, as discussed throughout this section, the state must al-
ways have a substantial interest in informing the audience.  Regardless 
of the state’s overall motivation for compelling speech, the state must 
seek to achieve this ultimate goal by providing the audience with in-
formation.  The calorie disclosures, for example, are motivated by the 
state’s interest in preventing and combatting obesity, but the state’s 
immediate goal is to inform consumers.  It is this informational goal 
 
139 Id. at 74.  One of the panel’s clear worries was the inability to place any limit on what 
types of disclosures might be required, were consumer curiosity alone a sufficient state in-
terest.  See id. 
140 See id. at 75–77 (Leval, J., dissenting).  Judge Leval notes that the long-term health effects 
of rBST are unknown, and that the disclosure therefore does serve the state’s interest in 
public health even if short-term studies have not established deleterious health effects.  
Moreover, Judge Leval notes other interests served by the disclosure, which include 
health risks to cows, the economic effects of the hormone’s use on smaller dairy farmers, 
and moral objections to genetically modified food.  Id.  See also Douglas A. Kysar, Prefer-
ences for Processes:  The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 525, 572–73 (2004).  However, as Professor Kysar argues, Judge Leval’s 
“stinging dissent” fails “to distinguish between the interests that consumers might espouse 
in favor of a state disclosure law and the interests that the state actually invokes.”  Id. at 
572.  Vermont did not advance other state interests as justification for the law, and Judge 
Leval’s dissent “was an attempt to resolve a different case than the one before the court.”  
Id. at 573. 
141 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 n.6 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
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that justifies treating compelled commercial speech differently from 
outright restrictions on commercial speech.  As the following section 
will illustrate, when the state no longer seeks to inform consumers, 
and instead compels speech that spreads a normative message, Zau-
derer’s rational basis scrutiny should no longer apply. 
IV.  THE CONTENT OF THE DISCLOSURE:  WHAT ARE THE LIMITS ON 
THE TYPES OF DISCLOSURE THAT CAN BE REQUIRED? 
Commercial disclosures must provide “purely factual and uncon-
troversial information”142 to be subject to Zauderer’s rational basis test.  
The purely factual nature of a disclosure law was one of the reasons 
for distinguishing Zauderer from the compelled ideological speech at 
issue in Barnette and Wooley.143  While a speaker may have an autonomy 
interest in not being required to recite the pledge of allegiance or 
display the state motto on his vehicle, a commercial speaker’s consti-
tutionally protected autonomy interest is minimal when he refuses to 
provide additional factual information about his products or services.  
Some forms of compelled speech, such as the aforementioned res-
taurant menu disclosures, clearly qualify as mandating purely factual, 
uncontroversial information.144  However, when the government 
moves beyond compelled speech that provides descriptive infor-
mation about a given product or service, to compelled speech that 
urges the audience to take a certain course of action, the government 
no longer compels the provision of factual and uncontroversial in-
formation.  Instead, the government compels “normative speech,” 
and such compelled speech should not be subject to rational basis re-
view. 
The term “normative speech,” as used in this Article, describes 
speech that expresses the government’s beliefs about how an individ-
ual should behave.  Thus, when the government compels speech that 
tells the audience what it “ought” to do,145 this speech conveys the 
government’s normative message, even if this message is based on 
factual information about a product or service.  It is the difference 
between compelling a restaurant owner to post a sign stating that a 
 
142 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
143 Id. 
144 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 134 (noting that the plaintiffs do not “contend that dis-
closure of calorie information is not ‘factual’”). 
145 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch 
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739) (drawing distinction between statements 
that describe the world, and statements that describe what one “ought” or “ought not” 
do). 
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hamburger has 800 calories, and a sign stating “you should not eat 
this hamburger if you are overweight.”  While compelled speech rais-
es fewer First Amendment concerns when it injects more information 
into the marketplace of ideas for the benefit of consumers, this dis-
tinction disappears if the compelled speech conveys the govern-
ment’s normative message.  This conclusion, however, does not mean 
that compelled normative speech per se violates the First Amend-
ment.  Instead, what this conclusion means is that Central Hudson, ra-
ther than Zauderer, sets forth the proper level of scrutiny for these 
kinds of commercial speech regulations.146 
The line between factual and normative disclosures may seem 
somewhat arbitrary:  after all, factual disclosures also serve the gov-
ernment’s normative agenda.  The government’s goal in posting a 
sign stating that a hamburger has 800 calories is to discourage indi-
viduals, particularly those who are overweight, from eating the ham-
burger, so why should we treat a sign stating “you should not eat this 
hamburger if you are overweight” differently from a sign stating the 
hamburger’s caloric content?  While there is assuredly a normative 
component to the calorie disclosure, the actual speech being com-
pelled does not contain the government’s normative message.  In 
contrast, when the speaker is being forced to repeat the govern-
ment’s normative judgments, her autonomy is being compromised:  
she is being forced to be a billboard for the government’s message.147  
Compelled normative speech, even if based on factual information 
about a product’s risks, raises similar concerns as Wooley and Barnette 
by forcing the speaker to express the government’s opinions and be-
liefs.148 
While a speaker’s constitutionally protected autonomy interests 
are minimal when she is being required to include more information 
in her commercial speech, the Court has made clear that a speaker 
does have an autonomy interest in not being required to spread the 
government’s normative message, even when engaging in commer-
cial speech.  In United States v. United Foods, Inc.,149 the Court evaluated 
 
146 This conclusion will be discussed further, infra Part IV. 
147 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (“New Hampshire’s statute in effect 
requires that appellees use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s 
ideological message—or suffer a penalty . . . .”). 
148 See id. at 715 (“Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which forces an indi-
vidual . . . to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of 
view he finds unacceptable. . . . The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to 
hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New 
Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.”). 
149 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
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a First Amendment challenge to a statute requiring mushroom pro-
ducers to subsidize commercial speech promoting a message with 
which they disagreed.150  The mushroom producer challenging the 
law disagreed with the message that all mushrooms are worthy of 
consuming, and wished to spread its own message that its brand of 
mushrooms were of superior quality.  Though recognizing that the 
mushroom producer’s disagreement with the message at issue could 
be characterized as “minor,” the Court found that “First Amendment 
values are at serious risk if the government can compel a particular 
citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for 
speech on the side that it favors.”151 
As Dean Post argues, United Foods can be read as standing for the 
following proposition:  while commercial speech is protected because 
of the First Amendment interests of its audience, speakers engaged in 
commercial speech retain independent First Amendment interests 
that can be violated by certain forms of compelled speech.152  In Unit-
ed Foods, the Court makes clear that a speaker’s First Amendment 
rights are violated by a compelled message, even if (1) the speech at 
issue is commercial, and (2) the compelled message merely advocates 
the use of a product, rather than compelling adherence to ideologi-
cal beliefs.  The message at issue did not provide purely factual in-
formation about the health benefits of eating mushrooms—it was a 
normative and viewpoint-based153 message urging consumers to eat 
any brand of mushrooms.  The Court’s reasoning in United Foods 
makes clear that the rational basis test set forth in Zauderer should not 
apply if the state compels the inclusion of a normative message in 
commercial speech.154 
The key question, however, is how to identify when a commercial 
disclosure law no longer conveys pure facts and crosses the line into 
normative speech.  As discussed above, the government’s ultimate ob-
jective of changing consumer behavior does not mean that the 
 
150 Id. at 410–11. 
151 Id. at 411. 
152 Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets, supra note 72, at 577 (“The holding of United Foods 
can be explained only on the assumption that commercial speakers retain significant 
constitutional interests that are not fully captured by the constitutional values inherent in 
the circulation of information. . . . United Foods must break with the Court’s traditional 
explanation of its commercial speech doctrine and move from constitutional values that 
are audience-centered to those that are speaker-centered.”). 
153 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411. 
154 See Estreicher, supra note 60, at 272 (arguing that compelling commercial speakers to 
“serve as a medium for another person’s ideological communications” violates their First 
Amendment right not to speak). 
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speech is normative.  In fact, many commercial disclosure laws have 
the express purpose of changing behavior through information.  Nu-
tritional disclosures on packaged products seek to encourage healthi-
er food choices, warnings on alcohol packages seek to discourage 
pregnant women from drinking, and written warning labels on ciga-
rette packages seek to curb smoking rates.  The fact that a given dis-
closure has a “consumer . . . modification objective”155 does not mean 
that the disclosure requires the commercial actor to adopt the gov-
ernment’s normative message.  After all, if the information were ir-
relevant to consumers’ decisions, it would be impossible to argue that 
the state had an interest in mandating the provision of this infor-
mation.  The objective of any information disclosure policy is to “pro-
vide new information that can potentially alter individual deci-
sions.”156 
The distinction, however, is that the immediate purpose of these 
disclosure policies is to convey uncontroversial factual information 
about a given product, even if the ultimate motive is to change behav-
ior.157  None of these disclosures require commercial actors to express 
the government’s message that a given product is good or bad.  The 
state seeks to persuade individuals to make certain choices by provid-
ing them with relevant factual information, which is a valid goal given 
that the purpose of the commercial speech doctrine is to protect the 
audience’s informational interests.158  As the Ninth Circuit recently 
observed, albeit in a case that was reheard en banc: 
[M]ost disclosure requirements, from nutritional facts on packaged 
foods to the financial details of publicly traded companies, are designed 
to remedy information asymmetries and potentially alter individuals’ be-
havior as they become more well-informed market participants.  As long 
as those who are compelled to disclose are not required to endorse the 
possible result of a better-informed market . . . the fact that legislators 
may desire the resulting behavior is irrelevant.  In such cases, the disclos-
 
155 See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say About the Constitutionality of 
Persuasive Government Speech on Product Labels, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 855, 880–81 (2010) 
(“Many existing labeling requirements depend upon government authority to require 
disclosure of information because of the ‘reactions’ it presumes consumers will have to 
un-supplemented information and for the purpose of modifying consumer behavior to 
serve the government’s determination of the public interest.”). 
156 WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION 5 
(1992). 
157 See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 794 (2001) (distin-
guishing between the “further purpose” or “motive” behind a law, and the law’s “immedi-
ate purpose,” and concluding that courts should focus on the law’s immediate purpose). 
158 See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 156, at 6 (“[T]he objective of such efforts is informed 
choice, not simply altered choice.”). 
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ing party is required only to provide the raw facts that others may use to 
make their own decisions.159 
In contrast, if the mandated disclosure expresses the govern-
ment’s normative message about the product, such a law crosses the 
line set by Wooley, Barnette, and United Foods.  This kind of disclosure 
law does not seek to change behavior through information, but ra-
ther to change behavior by spreading the government’s message that 
a certain product should or should not be used. 
It will often be easy to determine whether a written or oral disclo-
sure expresses a normative message, because the normative content 
will be evident based on the disclosure’s face.  For example, the 
aforementioned hypothetical disclosure “you should not eat this 
hamburger if you are overweight” explicitly spreads a normative mes-
sage.  Compelled graphic or visual disclosures, however, may be more 
difficult to evaluate—it is not easy to evaluate whether a visual graph-
ic conveys factual information or instead spreads a normative mes-
sage.  What if the state were to require all menu items over 1000 calo-
ries to be accompanied by a picture of an obese person surrounded 
by empty food containers?  Does this image just convey factual infor-
mation, or does it disgust viewers and spread the government’s mes-
sage that you should not order that particular item?  As Professor Re-
becca Tushnet has persuasively argued, “[t]he power of images comes 
not just from the emotions they evoke but also from the linked fea-
ture that they are hard to see as arguments:  they persuade without 
overt appeals to rhetoric.”160  An image may contain factual infor-
mation, but it may also appeal to the audience’s emotions:161  images 
can “persuade without seeming to persuade.”162  One needs only con-
 
159 Jerry Beeman & Pharm. Servs. Inc. v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 652 F.3d 1085, 
1101 n.16 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original), reh’g en banc granted, 661 F.3d 1199 (9th 
Cir. 2011), question certified by 682 F.3d 779 (9th Cir. 2012). 
160 Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words:  The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 
692 (2012). 
161 Id. at 696 (“Images, by not making their appeal to emotion explicit, provide a way to 
bring emotion to law despite law’s expressed discomfort with emotions.”); see also Christi-
na O. Spiesel et al., Law in the Age of Images:  The Challenge of Visual Literacy, in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 231, 237 (Anne Wagner et al. eds., 
2005) (arguing that visual stories are “rich in emotional appeal, which is deeply tied to 
the communicative power of imagery.  This power stems in part from the impression that 
visual images are unmediated.  They seem to be caused by the reality they depict”); Amy 
Adler, The Thirty-Ninth Annual Edward G. Donley Memorial Lectures:  The Art of Censorship, 
103 W. VA. L. REV. 205, 213 (2000) (“[B]y bypassing reason and appealing directly to the 
senses, images fail to participate in the marketplace of ideas.”). 
162 Tushnet, supra note 160, at 696.  See also Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead, Introduction to 
LAW AND THE IMAGE:  THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW 7 (Costas 
Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999) (“Images are sensual and fleshy; they address the la-
!
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sider the government’s recent refusal to release photos of Osama Bin 
Laden’s dead body to illustrate the point that images convey more 
than just factual information, and can elicit strong emotional reac-
tions from viewers.163  It can be very difficult to conclude based on the 
face of an image whether the image just conveys factual information. 
Because of the difficulty in evaluating whether visual disclosures 
mandate normative speech, courts should look to the government’s 
actual purpose in mandating the visual disclosure when determining 
whether rational basis scrutiny is warranted.  Courts have ample ex-
perience smoking out illegitimate government purposes, particularly 
within the First Amendment doctrine,164 and a purpose inquiry is the 
most reliable way of ensuring that the state does not use visual com-
mercial disclosure laws to spread normative messages that are dis-
guised as factual speech.  In order to determine whether rational ba-
sis scrutiny applies to a visual disclosure law, courts should evaluate 
the government’s purpose in mandating the disclosure:  if the gov-
ernment’s actual purpose is not to inform consumers, but rather to 
spread the government’s normative message, then the disclosure falls 
outside of Zauderer. 
This section will look to laws requiring compelled speech in the 
sale of tobacco in an effort to identify the line separating disclosures 
designed to inform consumers from disclosures designed to spread a 
normative message.  I will consider new species of tobacco warning 
laws that do not just provide written warnings about the product’s 
health consequences, and instead accompany these written warnings 
with visual depictions of the consequences of tobacco use.  I conclude 
that the state intends for these disclosures to spread a normative mes-
sage that individuals should not smoke, and that the disclosures 
 
bile elements of the self, they speak to the emotions . . . . They have the power to short-
circuit reason and enter the soul . . . .”); David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, 
Gruesome Evidence and Emotion:  Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 183 (2006) (showing that jurors often have an emotional response to gruesome 
photographs). 
163 Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, Judicial Watch, 
Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Def., 2012 WL 1438688 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2012) (No. 11-890) (“The 
release of images showing the bullet wound to bin Laden’s head plausibly and logically 
pose a particularly grave threat of inflaming anti-American sentiment and resulting in re-
taliatory harm.”).  The district court accepted the government’s argument, concluding 
that the government’s testimony “that the release of images of his body could reasonably 
be expected to pose a risk of grave harm to our future national security is more than 
mere speculation.”  Judicial Watch, 2012 WL 1438688, at *15. 
164 For a discussion of the role of legislative purpose in the First Amendment doctrine, see 
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:  The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amend-
ment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996).  See also Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 794. 
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should be subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson ra-
ther than Zauderer’s rational basis test. 
A. Overview of Tobacco Warning Laws 
The federal government has mandated warning labels on ciga-
rette packages since 1965.  The labels carried on cigarette packages, 
which have been modified over the years, are “the most familiar ex-
ample”165 of mandatory informational disclosures, and provide yet 
another example of a disclosure policy that serves interests beyond 
curing consumer deception and confusion. 
The first iteration of tobacco labeling, the Federal Cigarette La-
beling and Advertising Act of 1965,166 required cigarette packages to 
carry the following warning:  “Caution:  Cigarette Smoking May Be 
Hazardous to Your Health.”167  In 1984, the text of the warning label 
was modified, and cigarette advertisements were also required to car-
ry health warnings.  The Comprehensive Smoking Education Act168 
amended the 1965 act to require the rotation of four different warn-
ing labels on packaging and advertising.  Congress’s stated purpose in 
adopting the new labeling requirements was to make “Americans 
more aware of any adverse health effects of smoking . . . and to ena-
ble individuals to make informed decisions about smoking.”169  These 
warning labels have never been challenged by the tobacco industry as 
unconstitutionally compelling speech.170  While cigar companies did 
challenge similar warning requirements imposed on cigar packaging 
and advertising by the state of Massachusetts, the First Circuit reject-
ed their challenge, relying on Zauderer.171 
 
165 Sunstein, supra note 54, at 661. 
166 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965).  
The stated purpose of the 1965 Act was to enact a uniform cigarette labeling requirement 
that would ensure that the public was “adequately informed that cigarette smoking may 
be hazardous to health . . . .”  Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4(a), 98 Stat. 2201 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2006)). 
169 Id. 
170 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 n.4 (D.D.C. 2011). 
171 Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30, 54–55 (1st Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds 
by Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).  More specifically, the cigar com-
panies argued that the requirement that the warnings cover 25% of the main panel of the 
packaging and 20% of the advertisements unduly burdened their commercial speech.  
The First Circuit rejected this argument, given that Zauderer does not require a least re-
strictive means analysis, and the compelled warnings were “reasonably related to a sub-
stantial state interest.”  Id. at 55. 
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The most recent federal legislation, the Family Smoking Preven-
tion and Tobacco Control Act,172 adopts nine different warning labels 
to be rotated on cigarette packages: 
WARNING:  Cigarettes are addictive.  WARNING:  Tobacco smoke can 
harm your children.  WARNING:  Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease.  
WARNING:  Cigarettes cause cancer.  WARNING:  Cigarettes cause 
strokes and heart disease.  WARNING:  Smoking during pregnancy can 
harm your baby.  WARNING:  Smoking can kill you.  WARNING:  Tobac-
co smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers.  WARNING:  Quitting 
smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your health.173 
The warning label must take up 50% of the front and rear of the cig-
arette package, and 20% of any print advertisement.174  The Act also 
requires the Secretary of the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
to “issue regulations that require color graphics depicting the nega-
tive health consequences of smoking to accompany the label state-
ments . . . .”175 
In accordance with the Act, the FDA issued a Proposed Rule set-
ting forth thirty-six potential graphic images to be displayed on to-
bacco packaging and advertisements.176  The Proposed Rule also re-
quired the warning labels to include “a reference to a smoking 
cessation assistance resource.”177  After a period of notice and com-
ment, the FDA published a Final Rule (“the Rule”) on June 22, 
2011.178  The Rule selected nine graphic warning labels.  The selected 
images have been described as follows: 
[A] man exhaling cigarette smoke through a tracheotomy hole in his 
throat; a plume of cigarette smoke enveloping an infant receiving a kiss 
from his or her mother; a pair of diseased lungs next to a pair of healthy 
lungs; a diseased mouth afflicted with what appears to be cancerous le-
sions; a man breathing into an oxygen mask; a bare-chested male cadaver 
lying on a table, and featuring what appears to be post-autopsy chest sta-
ples down the middle of his torso; a woman weeping uncontrollably; and 
a man wearing a t-shirt that features a “no smoking” symbol and the 
words “I Quit.”  An additional graphic image appears to be a stylized car-
 




175 Id.  The Act permits the Secretary to modify the precise formatting stipulations mandated 
by the Act to permit for the graphic labeling. 
176 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 
69,534–35 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141). 
177 Id. at 69,564. 
178 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 
22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141). 
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toon (as opposed to a staged photograph) of a premature baby in an in-
cubator.179 
Each of the graphic images matches with one of the written warn-
ings.180  In addition, all of the labels must include the phone number 
“1-800-QUIT-NOW,”181 which will connect smokers with smoking ces-
sation resources.182 
The tobacco industry has successfully challenged the FDA’s Rule 
on First Amendment grounds:  the D.C. Circuit recently affirmed the 
United States District Court of the District of Columbia’s permanent 
injunction of the FDA’s Final Rule as unconstitutional compelled 
speech.183  The district court concluded that the Rule did not fit with-
in “the Zauderer paradigm”184 because “the graphic images here were 
neither designed to protect the consumer from confusion or decep-
tion, nor to increase consumer awareness of smoking risks; rather, 
they were crafted to evoke a strong emotional response calculated to 
provoke the viewer to quit or never start smoking.”185  The district 
court conceded that “the line between the constitutionally permissi-
 
179 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41–42 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation 
omitted).  The images can be accessed online.  See Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, 
FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/Labeling/CigaretteWarningLabels/uc
m259214.htm (follow link under “High Resolution Image Formats”) (last visited Oct. 4, 
2012) [hereinafter “Final Images”]. 
180 For example, the written warning “WARNING:  Cigarettes are addictive” pairs with the 
image of a hole in a man’s throat.  Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Adver-
tisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,649 (June 22, 2011). 
181 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,686–87, 
36,754–55 (June 22, 2011). 
182 New York City has also adopted graphic labeling requirements.  In the fall of 2009, New 
York City’s Board of Health adopted Article 181.19, which required all of the city’s tobac-
co retailers to “prominently display” a sign with written information about tobacco’s ad-
verse health effects and how to get help quitting the use of tobacco, as well as “a pictorial 
image illustrating the effects of tobacco use.”  N.Y., N.Y.C., BD. OF HEALTH art. 
181.19(a)(b) (2009).  Tobacco retailers challenged New York’s signage regime as both 
being preempted by federal law, as well as violating the retailers’ First Amendment rights 
by unconstitutionally compelling speech.  The Southern District of New York granted 
summary judgment to the retailers on their preemption claim, without addressing the 
First Amendment implications of the compelled imagery.  23-34 94th Street Grocery 
Corp. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 757 F. Supp. 2d 407, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  The Second Cir-
cuit recently affirmed the district court’s ruling. 23-34 94th St. Grocery Corp. v. N.Y.C. Bd. 
of Health, No. 11-91-cv, 2012 WL 2819423 (2d Cir. July 10, 2012).  Thus while the courts 
have not addressed the First Amendment issues raised by New York City’s signage, the 
signs raise much of the same issues as the federal graphic labels.  This Article, however, 
will focus on the federal labels. 
183 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063, 2012 WL 3632003, (D.C. Cir. 
Aug. 24, 2012), affirming 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012). 
184 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d at 274. 
185 Id. at 272. 
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ble dissemination of factual information and the impermissible ex-
propriation of a company’s advertising space for Government advo-
cacy can be frustratingly blurry,”186 but concluded that “here the line 
seems quite clear.”187  The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court, 
concluding that Zauderer was inapplicable both because the graphic 
labels did not cure consumer deception,188 and because the graphic 
images were “not ‘purely’ factual because—as FDA tacitly admits—
they are primarily intended to evoke an emotional response, or, at 
most, shock the viewer into retaining the information in the text 
warning.”189  According to the D.C. Circuit majority, the Final Rule’s 
“inflammatory images and the provocatively-named hotline cannot 
rationally be viewed as pure attempts to convey information to con-
sumers,”190 and thus fell outside of the ambit of Zauderer. 
B. Drawing the Line Between Factual Disclosures and Normative Messages 
As discussed earlier in this section, the mere fact that the govern-
ment’s ultimate goal is to change behavior by reducing smoking rates 
does little to distinguish the graphic labeling requirements from writ-
ten tobacco warnings.  And while a technologically manipulated 
graphic that did not accurately depict the health consequences of 
smoking would assuredly raise different concerns, there is no evi-
dence that the graphics are enhanced in an unrealistic manner.191  
However, as the district court and the D.C. Circuit concluded, the ev-
idence of the state’s purpose in mandating the graphic labels suggests 
that these images are designed to shock and disgust viewers, not just 
to inform them about the dangers of tobacco use. 
When the state’s purpose in mandating a given disclosure is to 
shock and disgust the audience, the disclosure forces the speaker to 
spread the state’s normative message that a given product should not 
be used.  By intentionally appealing to the audience’s emotions ra-
ther than their reasoned judgment, this type of compelled speech 
can no longer be justified based on the audience’s informational in-
 
186 Id. at 274. 
187 Id. 
188 See supra text accompanying notes 206–14. 
189 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063, 2012 WL 3632003, at *7 (D.C. 
Cir. Aug. 24, 2012). 
190 Id. at *8. 
191 The FDA conceded to the district court that some of the images had been technologically 
modified, but maintained that “the effects shown in the photographs are, in fact, accurate 
depictions of the effects of sickness and disease caused by smoking.”  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d at 270 n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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terests.  While so-called “fear appeals,” a term that psychologists have 
used to describe “fear-arousing persuasive message[s]” that are “de-
signed to scare people by describing the terrible things that will hap-
pen to them if they do not do what the message recommends,”192 have 
become a regular feature of public-health campaigns for the past fifty 
years,193 this type of speech admittedly does not just convey pure fac-
tual information.  The psychological literature evaluating the persua-
siveness of different types of fear appeals demonstrates the complexi-
ty of the emotional and cognitive processing of these types of 
messages, and illustrates that the key goal in implementing fear ap-
peals is not to inform the audience, but to appeal to the audience’s 
emotions.194 
When the state intentionally compels shocking and disgusting im-
ages that capitalize on the audience’s emotional reactions, the state’s 
goal is altered choice, instead of informed choice.  Mandating speech 
that appeals to emotion “does not improve rational decision-making 
or encourage autonomy-affirming choices . . . .”195  Instead, “[t]he 
substantial literature on fear appeals and the influence of negative 
emotions such as fear and anxiety induced by a particular communi-
cation shows the potential for a change in an individual’s decision 
away from what it might have been in a non-emotional state.”196  
When the government designs a disclosure law that makes use of a 
fear appeal, the government’s goal is not to provide consumers with 
information, but rather to spread the government’s normative mes-
 
192 Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion:  Implications of Social Science Re-
search on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1, 16 (2008).  See, e.g., Natascha de 
Hoog, Wolfgang Stroebe, & John B. F. de Wit, The Impact of Vulnerability to and Severity of a 
Health Risk on Processing and Acceptance of Fear-Arousing Communications:  A Meta-Analysis, 11 
REV. OF GEN. PSYCHOL. 258, 258 (2007) (“Fear-arousing communications emphasize the 
negative consequences of health-impairing behaviors to motivate individuals to change 
these behaviors.”). 
193 de Hoog et al., supra note 192, at 258. 
194 See, e.g., id.; Glenn Leshner, Paul Bolls & Kevin Wise, Motivated Processing of Fear Appeal and 
Disgust Images in Televised Anti-Tobacco Ads, 23 J. MEDIA PSYCHOL. 77 (2011); Kim Witte & 
Mike Allen, A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeals:  Implications for Effective Public Health Campaigns, 
27 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 591 (2000).  Under the “drive-reduction model” of fear ap-
peals, the communication creates emotional tension that motivates or “drives” individuals 
to change their behavior in order to reduce the salience of the perceived threat.  de 
Hoog et al., supra note 192, at 259.  The “drive reduction” theory of fear appeals was first 
articulated in 1953.  See CARL I. HOVLAND, IRVING L. JANIS, & HAROLD H. KELLEY, 
COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION:  PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF OPINION CHANGE (1953); 
Irving L. Janis & Seymour Feshbach, Effects of Fear-Arousing Communication, 48 J. 
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 78 (1953). 
195 Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 939, 989 (2009). 
196 Blumenthal, supra note 192, at 32. 
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sage that a given product should not be used.  While speakers have 
minimal autonomy interests in not disclosing factual information 
about their products, speakers do have a constitutionally protected 
interest in not being forced to shock and disgust consumers about 
the dangers of a particular product. 
The FDA’s selection criterion for choosing which tobacco 
graphics to impose suggests that the government’s purpose in requir-
ing the graphic labels was not to provide tobacco users with infor-
mation about health risks, but rather to shock and disgust them into 
not using tobacco.  A 2007 Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) Report that 
is cited throughout the FDA’s regulations in support of the new 
graphic labels197 makes clear that, going forward, the “primary objec-
tive of tobacco regulation is not to promote informed choice, but ra-
ther to discourage consumption of tobacco products, especially by 
children and youths.”198  In designing the graphic images, the FDA 
was very clear that it sought to reduce smoking rates by using graphic 
images that were “frightening or visually disturbing.”199  When decid-
ing which graphic warnings to adopt in the Final Rule, the FDA 
measured several effects of the visual warnings as compared to text-
only warnings.  One of the most important measures relied upon dur-
ing the selection process was the “salience” of the graphic image, 
which included an “emotional reaction scale” that measured “how 
the warning made the respondent feel, such as ‘depressed,’ ‘discour-
aged,’ and ‘afraid.’”200  The FDA cited to research literature that “sug-
gests that warnings that generate an immediate emotional response 
from viewers can result in viewers attaching a negative affect to smok-
ing (i.e., feel bad about smoking), thus undermining the appeal and 
attractiveness of smoking.”201 
The graphic images were designed to evoke an emotional reaction 
that would convince tobacco users to stop using the product.  The 
 
197 See, e.g., Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 
69,524, 69,529–33 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141); Required Warn-
ings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,632–40 (Jun. 22, 
2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141). 
198 INST. OF MED., ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM:  A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION 291 
(2007) (quoting INST. OF MED., GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE:  PREVENTING NICOTINE 
ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND YOUTHS 236–37 (1994)).  The IOM report then advocates 
graphic tobacco labels as a means of discouraging tobacco consumption.  Id. at 296. 
199 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 
69,534 (Nov. 12, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 
1141). 
200 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 
36,638  (Jun. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141). 
201 Id. at 36,639. 
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message the government sought to convey was not just that tobacco 
has specific health risks, but that individuals should also not use to-
bacco because tobacco is dangerous, unappealing, and depressing.  
Although the FDA also cited to literature demonstrating that the im-
ages were also designed to serve informational goals by increasing the 
likelihood that smokers would read and think about the warning la-
bels,202 the government also had a completely non-informational goal:  
to spread the government’s normative message that individuals 
should not smoke.203 
Moreover, even if such explicit evidence of the government’s pur-
pose were not available, such a legislative purpose can be inferred.  
Courts have ample experience with the task of inferring legislative 
purpose by looking to evidence such as the actual content of the law, 
the law’s effects, its social context, and the common understanding of 
the law’s purpose.204  When evaluating the actual purposes behind a 
disclosure law that compels imagery, the images themselves can be 
useful in this process.  While attempting to infer legislative purpose 
based on the face of the images raises the same concerns discussed 
above about the difficulty of analyzing the persuasive effects of imag-
es,205 sometimes courts may need to consider the images themselves in 
order to get at the government’s real purpose.  However, by using the 
actual content of the images as just one piece of evidence in the 
court’s broader task of isolating the government’s purpose, the con-
cerns about how to analyze the true effects of visual imagery are 
somewhat reduced.  Moreover, when the compelled images are ac-
companied by text, as they are in the case of the graphic tobacco la-
 
202 Id.  The FDA argues that “health warnings that evoke strong emotional responses en-
hance an individual’s ability to process the warning information, leading to increased 
knowledge and thoughts about the harms of cigarettes and the extent to which the indi-
vidual could personally experience a smoking-related disease.”  Id. at 36,641.  By increas-
ing the likelihood that an individual will read a written warning and will contemplate the 
negative health effects of smoking, the graphic images do serve informational interests.  
But they do so by using the audience’s emotions, arguably in a manipulative manner. 
203 Another informational goal served by the visual disclosures might be to convey risk in-
formation to individuals with low literacy rates.   In the proposed rule, the FDA cited to 
literature demonstrating that individuals with low literacy rates have difficulty recalling 
text-only warnings in order to justify the need for the visual warnings.  Required Warnings 
for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,531 (Nov. 12, 2010) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).  However, as discussed above, the FDA’s focus in se-
lecting which graphic images to adopt was on the emotional salience of the images, not 
on whether the images better conveyed health risks to consumers with low literacy rates. 
204 Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 794–95 (indicating that the judiciary has a familiar set of 
tools to interpret legislative purpose by looking to the law’s language, its effect, its legisla-
tive history, the circumstances surrounding its enactment, and common knowledge). 
205 See supra text accompanying notes  234–49. 
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bels, the accompanying text can also inform the court’s analysis of 
the government’s purpose. 
Here, the graphic warnings themselves, displaying images such as 
a dead body on an autopsy table and a plume of smoke next to a 
newborn baby,206 strongly suggest that the government’s purpose was 
not to inform tobacco users about smoking’s health risks, but rather 
to discourage individuals from smoking by displaying shocking and 
disgusting images.  First, the informational content of many of the 
graphic images is incredibly low:  the body on the autopsy table, for 
example, conveys little information beyond the accompanying textual 
warning that “smoking can kill you.”207  The picture of the dead body 
does not add any informational content to the warning label.  Se-
cond, all of the graphic warnings include the phone number “1-800-
QUIT-NOW.”208  This number explicitly conveys the government’s 
normative message that individuals should quit smoking, which gives 
a strong indication of the government’s purpose in compelling the 
graphic images.  Third, the common reaction to these images is dis-
gust and shock—while it may be difficult, on the margins, to evaluate 
whether an image is factual or normative, courts can look to the 
common understanding of these images as one piece of evidence that 
sheds light on the government’s purpose.  Thus, even though it may 
be difficult to infer legislative purpose based on the face of these im-
ages, courts have ample experience with this task, and applying these 
tools to the tobacco images suggests that the government sought to 
compel normative speech. 
Although some of us may have fewer objections to the govern-
ment’s attempt to use tobacco producers to spread a normative mes-
sage that discourages an “inherently dangerous activity”209 with serious 
 
206 See Final Images, supra note 179, at 2, 7. 
207 Id. at 7.  As another example, one of the graphics in the final rule shows a man exhaling 
smoke through what appears to be a hole in his throat, with the text “Warning:  Ciga-
rettes are addictive.”  Id. at 1.  While the graphic likely depicts a tracheotomy hole, the 
warning label does not convey any information about what a tracheotomy is or when the 
procedure is necessary.  Instead, the label just shows a man holding a cigarette, and 
smoke expelling through a hole in his throat.  Another graphic conveys even less infor-
mation about smoking’s health effects, showing a woman crying and the caption:  “Warn-
ing:  Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers.”  Id. at 8.  While the FDA 
claims that this image portrays “the emotional suffering experienced as a result of disease 
caused by secondhand smoke exposure,” Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and 
Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,696 (Jun. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pt. 1141), this graphic provides little information about the specific health consequences 
of smoking. 
208 Final Images, supra note 179. 
209 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2, 123 Stat. 
1776, 1777 (2009). 
Nov. 2012] COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH 583 
 
health consequences, this is merely because we agree with the gov-
ernment’s objective of reducing rates of tobacco usage.  Agreeing 
with the government’s overall objective, however, is not a reason for 
ignoring the First Amendment rights of tobacco manufacturers.210  
While the negative health consequences of smoking are undisputed 
facts, the method of presenting these facts matters.  The Court has 
made clear that “the general rule is that the speaker and the audi-
ence, not the government, assess the value of the information pre-
sented”211 in the commercial marketplace.  With the visual tobacco 
images, however, the government has decided the value of the infor-
mation.  The government has decided that information about the 
health risks of tobacco is incredibly valuable, and that tobacco manu-
facturers must present this information in a shocking manner that 
will force the audience to react to it. 
Returning to a hypothetical proposed earlier, consider if a state 
decided that calorie information was not sufficiently deterring over-
weight consumers from ordering high-calorie items from restaurants.  
As a consequence, the state decides that menus and menu boards 
must include, alongside any food item containing more than 1000 
calories, a picture of an obese person next to multiple empty food 
containers and wrappers, along with the phone number 1-800-LOSE-
W8T.212  This type of visual display requirement arguably provides ad-
ditional factual information about the consequences of eating high-
calorie foods in service of the state’s public health goals.  But the 
state’s purpose would clearly not be to inform consumers—the calo-
rie disclosure already informs individuals about the high number of 
calories in those menu items.  Instead, the state’s likely goal in this 
hypothetical scenario would be to shock or disgust viewers and there-
by persuade them to order something with fewer calories.  While the 
picture may also serve to highlight the calorie information for those 
 
210 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (“[W]here the State’s interest is to dissemi-
nate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an 
individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”). 
211 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (discussing the value of unrestricted speech 
in the commercial marketplace). 
212 This hypothetical is not that far from reality:  New York City has recently promulgated a 
public health advertisement that features a picture of an overweight amputee, along with 
the caption:  “Portions have grown.  So has Type 2 diabetes, which can lead to amputa-
tions.”  Patrick McGeehan, Blame Photoshop, Not Diabetes, for This Amputation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 25, 2012, at A22.  The city was criticized for using a photo of an actor with fully intact 
legs, and digitally removing one of his legs to make its point.  Id.  While the city’s use of 
fear appeals in its own advertising does not raise any First Amendment issues, requiring 
restaurants or food producers to display such an image would be analogous to the visual 
tobacco warnings. 
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who would otherwise ignore it, the state cannot force restaurant own-
ers to convey shocking, value-laden images to their customers in or-
der to achieve the state’s informational goals.213  Consider, as an al-
ternative example, if a state required all abortion clinics to place a 
picture of a dead fetus on their signage and advertisements, along 
with the phone number 1-800-LUV-LIFE.214  Again, the state’s real 
purpose would be to shock women visiting the clinics, presumably in 
the service of the state’s interest in protecting prenatal life, and to 
spread the state’s normative message that women should carry their 
pregnancies to term.215  While the visual information displayed may 
be based on facts, its method of presentation cannot be ignored.  
Such an attempt to spread a normative message by shocking the au-
dience does not qualify for Zauderer’s rational basis review. 
This is not to say that the state can never use emotion-based fear 
appeals:  as mentioned above, fear appeals have a long history in pub-
lic health campaigns and the state’s use of shocking imagery in its 
own public health advertisements does not raise any First Amend-
ment concerns.  Nor is the state prohibited from compelling image-
ry—not all visual graphics are designed to spread a normative mes-
sage, and the state’s attempts to use imagery that is designed to 
inform consumers should still be subject to rational basis review.216  
 
213 See John P. Strouss III, Medical Pornography or Fair Warning:  Should the United States Adopt 
Canada’s Gruesome New Tobacco Labels?, 27 J. CORP. L. 315, 331 (2002) (“The government 
could cover fast food packages with pictures of clogged arteries and obese people.  It 
could cover alcoholic beverage containers with pictures of cirrhotic livers and mangled 
drunk driving victims.  In a paternalistic attempt to protect us from our own decisions by 
putting disgusting images on products, the government could make the world a nauseat-
ing place.”). 
214 While the speech of an abortion clinic’s staff members to its individual patients during 
the course of the patient’s care would not qualify as commercial speech, the clinic’s sign-
age and advertisements are forms of commercial speech because they concern the offer 
of services. 
215 In the Second Circuit appeal of New York City’s signage law, the plaintiffs analogize to 
the “factual” imagery used by anti-abortion groups to demonstrate how factual images can 
be used to play on the audience’s emotions in the service of an ideological position.  See 
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 45, 23-34 94th St. Grocery, Corp. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 
685 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-0091) (“[T]he City’s position ignores the numerous 
examples of images that, though ‘factual’ renditions of events in one sense, seek to play 
on emotions or fears to convey a highly subjective message.  One need only consider the 
‘factual’ pictures of aborted fetuses utilized by anti-abortion groups or the controversy 
over whether to release the graphic death photographs of Osama bin Laden to under-
stand this point.”). 
216 A majority of the Sixth Circuit recently came to this conclusion in reviewing a facial chal-
lenge to the graphic tobacco labeling requirements.  Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, 
Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559–60 (6th Cir. 2012).  Importantly, the panel was 
not reviewing the actual images promulgated by the FDA.  Instead, the panel reviewed 
the statute’s requirement that the FDA set forth color graphics, and the panel concluded 
!
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Zauderer itself recognizes that images in commercial advertisements 
can “attract[] the attention of the audience to the advertiser’s mes-
sage” as well as “impart[ing] information directly.”217  For example, 
the nutritional labeling laws that apply to packaged products have 
been criticized for not providing information in a clear and easily 
understandable form.218  As a consequence, the FDA is currently con-
sidering adopting a front of package labeling scheme that will convey 
nutritional information in a more user-friendly format.  The front of 
package labeling scheme will likely employ graphics like checkmarks 
or stars that will highlight a food product’s negative or positive at-
tributes.219  Importantly, however, the goal behind the use of these 
symbols is simply to make information more easily understandable 
and accessible, especially given the evidence that busy consumers 
cannot always take the time to read the full nutritional label, and that 
low literacy consumers do not always understand the significance of 
the information provided on it.220  These symbols are not designed to 
evoke emotional reactions:  a “healthy choice checkmark” on a box of 
cereal is a far cry from a picture of a diseased lung on a cigarette 
package.  Thus, if the government compels the use of a picture or 
graphic whose sole purpose is to convey information, this type of 
commercial disclosure law falls within the Zauderer paradigm.221  But if 
the state seeks to compel speakers to act as a billboard for the state’s 
normative message, rational basis review should not apply. 
 
that the plaintiffs had failed to show that color graphics were per se unable to convey fac-
tual information about smoking’s health consequences.  Id. at 524, 531. 
217 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985). 
218 FUNG ET AL., supra note 1, at 84–85. 
219 See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Front-of-Package Food and Beverage Labeling:  New Directions for Re-
search and Regulation, 40 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 382, 383 (2011).  Some food compa-
nies have voluntarily adopted front of package nutritional labeling using graphics, but the 
FDA has expressed concern that these voluntary labels may represent certain food prod-
ucts as being healthier than warranted.  Id.  The FDA hopes that a uniform graphic label-
ing scheme with set criterion will ensure that the labels accurately convey a product’s nu-
tritional benefits, or lack thereof.  Id. 
220 Background Information on Point of Purchase Labeling, FDA (Oct. 2009), www.fda.gov/Food/
LabelingNutrition/LabelClaims/ucm187320.htm. 
221 In some instances pictures or graphics may be the best way to convey a certain fact given 
our understanding of how individuals actually process information.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
LAWS OF FEAR:  BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 195 (2005) (“[I]t is hopelessly in-
adequate to say that when people lack relevant information the best response is to pro-
vide it. . . . [I]f people lack information, a great deal of attention needs to be paid to in-
formation processing . . . .”).  Thus, refusing to extend Zauderer to situations where the 
government plays on the audience’s emotions does not restrict the government from 
conveying information in an easily understandable format:  it simply prohibits the gov-
ernment from using emotional appeals that do not promote autonomy and freedom of 
choice. 
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C. Applying Central Hudson to the Visual Tobacco Laws 
Nor does my conclusion mean that all compelled normative 
speech is per se unconstitutional.  It simply means that this type of 
compelled speech should not be subject to rational basis review.  It 
remains possible that the graphic tobacco warnings would be able to 
meet a higher level of scrutiny. 
Since the visual tobacco warnings apply to commercial speech, the 
government must meet Central Hudson’s intermediate level of scruti-
ny.  The D.C. Circuit recently reached this same conclusion in evalu-
ating the graphic tobacco labels, disagreeing with the district court’s 
holding that strict scrutiny should apply, and instead applying Central 
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny.222  Given that there is no question that 
the warnings on tobacco packages affect tobacco manufacturers’ 
commercial speech, the government must satisfy Central Hudson:  the 
regulation must be in the service of a substantial state interest, the 
 
222 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063, 2012 WL 3632003, at *8 (D.C. 
Cir. Aug. 24, 2012).  The district court did not provide any explanation for why Central 
Hudson, which sets forth the general test for commercial speech regulations, would not 
apply to the graphic tobacco labels.  See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 
2d 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2012).  The district court also failed to provide any Supreme Court 
precedent to support its conclusion that strict scrutiny should apply.  Id. at 274.  Although 
the district court cited to the Seventh Circuit’s recent application of strict scrutiny to a 
state law that required games deemed “sexually explicit” to be labeled with a sticker indi-
cating that the games were for those over age eighteen, id. (citing Entm’t Software Ass’n 
v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006)), the Seventh Circuit also did not pro-
vide any rationale for why strict scrutiny, rather than Central Hudson, was the proper test.  
Entm’t Software Ass’n, 469 F.3d at 652.  Looking to Supreme Court precedent on point, 
while the Court applied strict scrutiny to the compelled speech at issue in Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 475 U.S. 1 (1986), the Court was ex-
plicit that the law under review affected the electric company’s fully-protected, non-
commercial speech.  See id. at 8 (holding that the company’s newsletter received full First 
Amendment protection because its contents are “no different from a small newspa-
per . . . [ranging] from energy-saving tips to stories about wildlife conservation”).  Similar-
ly, while the Court applied strict scrutiny to the compelled speech requirement at issue in 
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), the Court did so after conclud-
ing that the disclosure affected fully-protected, non-commercial speech.  Id. at 795–96.  
Looking to the Court’s application of strict scrutiny when evaluating a regulation affect-
ing commercial speech, while the Court applied strict scrutiny to the compelled subsidy 
at issue in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) this was because the gov-
ernment had not argued that Central Hudson should apply.  United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 
410 (“[T]he Government itself does not rely upon Central Hudson to challenge the Court 
of Appeals’ decision, and we therefore do not consider whether the Government’s inter-
est could be considered substantial for purposes of the Central Hudson test.” (citation 
omitted)).  In sum, there is no Supreme Court precedent that supports the D.C. District 
Court’s statement that the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to regulations that com-
pel commercial speech.  The D.C. Circuit correctly held that Central Hudson’s intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny sets forth the proper test. 
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regulation must directly serve that state interest, and it must be no 
more extensive than necessary.223 
While a thorough analysis of the Central Hudson test is beyond the 
scope of this article,224 the state may well be able to show that the visu-
al tobacco warnings meet Central Hudson’s test given the serious 
health risks of tobacco usage and the inability of current textual 
warnings to convey these health risks to consumers.  First, given the 
public health consequences of smoking, the graphic warnings clearly 
serve a substantial state interest in reducing smoking rates and effec-
tively communicating the health risks of smoking to consumers.225  
Second, the visual tobacco warnings directly serve this interest by 
conveying shocking and disgusting images that convey this risk in-
formation and discourage individuals from starting or continuing to 
smoke.226 
The dispositive question is whether the government would be able 
to meet Central Hudson’s final requirement that the regulation is no 
more extensive than necessary in order for the government to 
achieve its goal.  Given the evidence that text-only tobacco warnings 
are often ignored or quickly forgotten,227 the fact that shocking 
graphic warnings may lead to greater recall of the warning and to a 
higher likelihood of cessation behavior228 helps to demonstrate that 
the graphic warnings are no more extensive than necessary.  Here, 
the strong emotional reactions caused by the graphic images actually 
 
223 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
224 The D.C. Circuit’s opinion provides further analysis of this point, with the majority con-
cluding that the labels do not meet the Central Hudson test.  See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
2012 WL 3632003, at *9–12.  The dissent comes to the opposite conclusion.  See id. at 
*23–26 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
225 See id. at *23–24 (Rogers, J. dissenting) (discussing the substantial government interests at 
stake). 
226 See id. at *24. 
227 Paul M. Fischer et al., Recall and Eye Tracking Study of Adolescents Viewing Tobacco Advertise-
ments, 261 JAMA 84, 88 (1989) (finding that almost two-thirds of adolescents surveyed ig-
nored the textual warnings or did not look at the warning for long enough to recall any 
words); Thomas N. Robinson & Joel D. Killen, Do Cigarette Warning Labels Reduce Smoking?  
Paradoxical Effects Among Adolescents, 151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 267, 
270 (1997) (finding that as little as one third of surveyed regular teenage smokers re-
called seeing a textual warning). 
228 Geoffrey T. Fong et al., The impact of pictures on the effectiveness of tobacco warnings, 87 BULL. 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 640, 640–42 (2009); David Hammond et al., Showing leads to doing:  
graphic cigarette warning labels are an effective public health policy, 16 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 223, 
223–24 (2006); David Hammond et al., Text and Graphic Warnings on Cigarette Packages:  
Findings from the International Tobacco Control Four Country Study, 32 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE 
MED. 202, 207 (2007); Michelle O’Hegarty et al., Reactions of Young Smokers to Warning La-
bels on Cigarette Packages, 30 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 467, 467 (2006). 
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support their constitutionality by strengthening the government’s 
case for the need to go beyond text-only warnings in order to achieve 
its goal of reducing smoking rates.  The application of Central Hud-
son’s intermediate level of scrutiny, however, will ensure that the gov-
ernment can only seek to compel normative speech that shocks and 
disgusts in narrow circumstances where bare factual information fails 
to adequately serve the substantial state interests at stake.229 
D. Implications for Other Commercial Disclosure Policies 
The new tobacco warning laws are not the only circumstance in 
which the government compels normative disclosures.  Thus, it is 
worth noting the implications of applying Central Hudson to norma-
tive disclosure policies outside of the tobacco context.  Consider, for 
example, the federal requirements that hazardous pesticides be la-
beled with precautionary statements such as “wear goggles or face 
shield and rubber gloves when handling,”230 or “do not breathe va-
pors.”231  These are normative statements that explicitly direct indi-
viduals how to behave, instead of simply providing information about 
the hazards associated with these products.  As a consequence, were 
such labeling requirements to be challenged on First Amendment 
grounds, the distinction between normative and factual speech would 
mean that these labels would have to meet Central Hudson’s test.  Giv-
en that these pesticides pose serious and immediate health conse-
quences, however, the government would very likely be able to show 
that these types of labeling requirements directly advance the state’s 
interest and are no more extensive than necessary.  Poisonous chemi-
cals that pose immediate risks to life are precisely the type of situation 
where a normative government message can be justified on First 
Amendment grounds.  Thus, while the distinction between normative 
 
229 Though Central Hudson sets forth the general test for compelled commercial speech that 
spreads a normative message, it is important to caution that Central Hudson’s intermediate 
scrutiny would not apply if the state were to compel commercial speakers to include polit-
ical or ideological messages in their commercial speech.  For example, if the state were to 
require tobacco packages and advertisements to include a message supporting health 
care reform, strict scrutiny should apply.  The state cannot use commercial speech as a 
vehicle for spreading its own political and ideological messages, even if these messages 
have some marginal relationship to the particular product being sold.  For a discussion of 
the First Amendment issues raised by compelled ideological speech, albeit in a non-
commercial context, see Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound 
Laws:  The First Amendment’s Limits on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013). 
230 40 C.F.R. § 156.70. 
231 Id. 
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and factual disclosures may make it more difficult to establish the 
constitutionality of certain disclosure policies, it is very likely that 
such disclosure policies would withstand any First Amendment chal-
lenges.232 
V.  ZAUDERER’S SCOPE:  WHAT TYPE OF SPEECH CAN BE REQUIRED TO 
INCLUDE A FACTUAL DISCLOSURE? 
Perhaps the most fundamental limit on Zauderer’s scope is the type 
of speech at issue:  Zauderer’s rational basis test only applies if the 
compelled disclosure is attached to commercial speech.  What Zau-
derer fails to articulate, and indeed what the Court has yet to articu-
late, is a coherent definition of what qualifies as commercial 
speech.233  The increasing use of disclosure laws as a regulatory strate-
gy in realms outside the classic definition of commercial speech will 
challenge the courts to develop a more workable definition of com-
mercial speech.  This section will look to a new species of disclosure 
laws, those targeting pregnancy service centers, in an effort to devel-
op a flexible test for identifying commercial speech that takes into 
account the purposes of the commercial speech doctrine and the 
consumer’s informational interests. 
A. The Current Doctrine’s Confused Definition of Commercial Speech 
In the Supreme Court’s first extension of First Amendment pro-
tections to commercial speech, Virginia Pharmacy, the Court charac-
terized commercial speech as “speech which does no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction.”234  For the statute at issue in that 
case, which restricted pharmacists from advertising the price of pre-
 
232 Moreover, were producers of hazardous chemicals to challenge these types of labeling 
requirements on First Amendment grounds, their argument that these disclosures violate 
their autonomy seems shaky at best.  The government’s normative message merely in-
forms the audience how to use the product properly in order to minimize risks to health.  
While tobacco manufacturers assuredly disagree with the government’s message “do not 
smoke,” pesticide producers likely do not disagree with the government’s message that 
individuals should wear goggles when using their product. 
233 See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 129, at 638–39 (arguing that the Court’s definition 
of commercial speech “starts breaking down” when the commercial nature of more com-
plicated speech acts are analyzed); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architec-
ture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1184–85 (1988) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court, for all it has said about commercial speech, has conspicuously avoided saying just 
what it is.”). 
234 Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) 
(quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). 
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scription drugs, such a narrow definition sufficed.  The Court later 
described speech proposing a commercial transaction as “the core 
notion of commercial speech.”235  Central Hudson provides little elabo-
ration on the definition of commercial speech that falls outside of 
this core, describing commercial speech as speech “related solely to 
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”236  While the 
Court has characterized the Central Hudson definition as encompass-
ing a “somewhat larger category”237 of speech than that articulated in 
Virginia Pharmacy, this definition has been criticized for failing to set 
forth a workable test for identifying commercial speech.238  The 
Court, however, does not pretend that there is a clear-cut definition 
of commercial speech:  the Court has recognized the “difficulty of 
drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a 
distinct category.”239 
The Court’s most extensive discussion of the boundaries of com-
mercial speech is in a case where the commercial nature of the 
speech at issue required closer analysis:  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products 
Corp.240  In Bolger, the plaintiff challenged a federal statute prohibiting 
the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives.  The 
plaintiff, who manufactured, sold, and distributed contraceptives, 
sought to mail a variety of materials to the general public.  Some of 
these materials directly promoted the plaintiff’s products, and other 
materials were “informational pamphlets discussing the desirability 
and availability of prophylactics in general.”241  While the Court found 
the materials that explicitly advertised the plaintiff’s products to qual-
ify as commercial speech without much discussion, the informational 
pamphlets “present[ed] a closer question.”242 
In evaluating the commercial nature of the informational pam-
phlets, the Court considered a number of factors:  whether the 
speech was an advertisement, whether the speech referred to a specif-
ic product, and whether the speakers had an economic motivation 
 
235 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983). 
236 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
237 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993). 
238 See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 494 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(criticizing the Court’s definition of commercial speech in Central Hudson:  “[E]conomic 
motivation or impact alone cannot make speech less deserving of constitutional protec-
tion, or else all authors and artists who sell their works would be correspondingly disad-
vantaged”). 
239 Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 419. 
240 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
241 Id. at 62. 
242 Id. at 66. 
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for engaging in the speech.243  The Court ultimately concluded that 
since the informational pamphlets combined all three of these char-
acteristics, they fell within the definition of commercial speech, even 
though the pamphlets also contained “discussions of important pub-
lic issues such as venereal disease and family planning.”244  The Court 
cautioned, however, that the presence of any one of these factors 
alone would be insufficient to render a particular speech act into 
commercial speech, and that none of these factors are essential to the 
definition.245  The Bolger factors, thus, are neither sufficient nor neces-
sary to the definition of commercial speech.  They do, however, at 
least articulate a starting place for the analysis. 
The Court ultimately appears to be convinced that there is a 
“common-sense distinction”246 between commercial speech and fully 
protected speech that the courts will be able to recognize on a case-
by-case basis.  Dean Post argues that this simplistic definition is, in 
fact, just the opposite: 
The evaluations of “commonsense” are complex, contextual, and ulti-
mately inarticulate; the Court’s appeal to common sense acknowledges 
that the achievement of constitutional purposes cannot be reduced to 
any simple rule or determinate criteria.  The judgments of common 
sense ultimately revolve around questions of social meaning; they turn on 
whether the utterance of a particular speaker should be understood as an 
effort to engage public opinion or instead simply to sell products.247 
This contextual inquiry into the social meaning of a particular speech 
act goes beyond the factors articulated in Bolger and requires analyz-
ing the speech act as a whole. 
Various scholars have attempted to identify a common thread 
uniting the Court’s common-sense inquiry into what qualifies for pro-
tection under the commercial speech doctrine.  Daniel Halberstam 
argues that the Court’s definition of commercial speech depends up-
on the speech being part of a “predefined communicative project” 
rather than “unbounded public discourse.”248  He believes that the 
definition of commercial speech ultimately turns on the relationship 
between the speaker and audience.  When commercial speech is at 
issue, “the relationship between speaker and audience is transformed 
from an exploration of each other’s opinions and beliefs into a strat-
 
243 Id. at 66–67. 
244 Id. at 67–68 (footnote omitted). 
245 Id. at 66–67 & n.14. 
246 Id. at 64 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
247 Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 18. 
248 Halberstam, supra note 83, at 832. 
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egy of striking a bargain that is ultimately objectified in a material 
transaction.”249  He also believes, however, that this relationship 
should be evaluated from the perspective of “the reasonable person 
receiving the communication . . . . The question would be whether a 
person, knowing all the relevant facts, would reasonably understand 
the communication to be directed at the audience as potential con-
sumers.”250  Thus, Halberstam’s formulation evaluates the social con-
text of the relationship between the speaker and his audience, with a 
focus on the audience’s perspective. 
Others have argued that the commercial speech definition should 
focus on the content of the communication: 
If the message communicates a point of view or espouses something oth-
er than a commercial transaction, it is irrelevant that the speaker hopes 
to generate corporate good-will (that may someday lead to sales) in addi-
tion to imparting information.  If, on the other hand, the message seeks 
directly to induce consumption of a particular product or service, it is a 
nonexpressive communication entitled to constitutional protection only 
to the extent it furthers audience interests, even if the advertiser is pas-
sionately committed to his product or service.251 
This formulation, however, again focuses on the audience’s perspec-
tive:  if the audience would understand the speech to be about the 
use of a particular product or service, the speech is commercial 
speech.  The speaker’s ultimate motivations for engaging in the 
speech are irrelevant. 
Dean Post argues that the Court ultimately defines commercial 
speech as those forms of speech that are protected because of their 
informational function.  Characterizing commercial speech as 
“speech which is not itself public discourse, but which disseminates 
information to the public sphere that is useful for the conduct of 
public discourse,”252 he argues that the commercial speech doctrine 
applies to more than conventional advertising.  The doctrine also ap-
plies “to state regulations seeking to control the circulation of non-
advertising commercial information outside of public discourse.”253  
For Post, an integral component of commercial speech is its place-
ment outside of public discourse, defined as “those processes of 
communication that must remain open to the participation of citi-
zens if democratic legitimacy is to be maintained.”254  Under this for-
 
249 Id. at 832–33. 
250 Id. at 853. 
251 Estreicher, supra note 60, at 258–59. 
252 Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 63, at 974. 
253 POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 59, at 41. 
254 Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 7. 
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mulation, speech that does not explicitly promote the use of a partic-
ular product or service can qualify as commercial speech.  Here, 
again, the focus is not on the speaker’s motivations, but on the con-
tent of the particular speech act and the sphere in which it is com-
municated. 
The Ninth Circuit’s discussion in Environmental Defense Center v. 
EPA255 illustrates how some courts have dealt with First Amendment 
challenges to compelled speech regulations affecting speech that 
does not fit within the Court’s narrow definition of commercial 
speech.256  In upholding Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
rules under the Clean Water Act that required small municipal storm 
sewer providers to “distribute educational materials to the communi-
ty . . . about the impacts of storm water discharges on water bodies 
and the steps that the public can take to reduce pollutants in storm-
water runoff,”257 and to “[i]nform public employees, businesses, and 
the general public of hazards associated with illegal discharges and 
improper disposal of waste,”258 the court first analyzed the applicabil-
ity of the compelled commercial speech doctrine.  The Ninth Circuit 
looked to Zauderer, concluding that the EPA rules, similar to Zauder-
er’s attorney disclosure requirement, did not raise the same interests 
at stake in Wooley and Barnette.259  The EPA rules did not interfere with 
public discourse, nor require municipal storm sewer providers to 
adopt any ideological positions with which they disagreed.260  In fact, 
the rules left it up to the municipal storm sewer provider to develop 
the specific contents of their informational message:  the rules merely 
required “appropriate educational and public information activities 
that need not include any specific speech at all.”261 
 
255 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003). 
256 For an early Seventh Circuit decision interpreting the definition of commercial speech, 
see FTC v. Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977).  In this case, the 
Seventh Circuit held that a campaign by the National Commission on Egg Nutrition that 
denied the existence of scientific evidence between consumption of eggs and heart dis-
ease qualified as commercial speech, even though the Commission was a non-profit, and 
the campaign was not connected to any specific brand of eggs. 
257 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b)(1)(i) (2011). 
258 Id. at § 122.34(b)(3)(ii)(D). 
259 Envtl. Def. Ctr., 344 F.3d at 849. 
260 Id. at 850 (“Informing the public about safe toxin disposal is non-ideological; it involves 
no ‘compelled recitation of a message’ and no ‘affirmation of belief.’” (quoting Prune-
yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980))). 
261 Id. at 849.  Since the rules did not specify the content of the compelled speech, there is 
no suggestion that the government required the storm sewer providers to spread a nor-
mative message about how the public should behave.  Instead, the rules require the pro-
viders to give the public information about the impact of storm water discharge, how to 
reduce pollutants, and the hazards of illegal discharge. 
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The court found additional support for its conclusion in National 
Electrical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Sorrell,262 the Second Circuit case up-
holding Vermont’s statute requiring manufacturers to label products 
containing mercury.  The panel concluded that while the municipal 
storm sewer providers’ speech was “not . . . ‘commercial’ in the same 
sense that manufacturer labeling is . . . it will be similar in substance 
to Sorrell to the extent that it informs the public how to dispose safely 
of toxins.”263  The court focused on the informational value of the 
speech at issue, and its non-ideological nature, in concluding that the 
same principles of the commercial speech doctrine should apply:  
“the policy considerations underlying the commercial speech treat-
ment of labeling requirements. . . apply similarly in the context of the 
market-participant municipal storm sewer provider.”264  Ultimately the 
court’s analysis of the First Amendment rights at stake looks to the 
context and content of the speech being compelled—while the court 
stopped short of classifying the public information requirement as 
compelled commercial speech, it recognized that the principles of 
the doctrine should apply in light of the informational interests being 
served by the EPA rule.265 
Environmental Defense Center illustrates the problem with a narrow 
definition of commercial speech:  the government often compels fac-
tual disclosures in areas beyond mere proposals of commercial trans-
actions, yet there is no First Amendment doctrine addressing these 
types of regulations.  So the courts are either required to recognize 
the interests of the commercial speech doctrine in applying some 
form of reduced First Amendment scrutiny, as the Ninth Circuit did 
in Environmental Defense Center, or the courts are forced to fit the regu-
lation within the Court’s confused definition of commercial speech.  
A commercial speech definition that focuses on the exchange of 
money for the purchase of a product or service fails to recognize that 
many of our regulatory policies have goals completely disconnected 
from economic harm.266  A broader definition of commercial speech 
 
262 272 F.3d 104 (2001). 
263 Envtl. Def. Ctr., 344 F.3d at 851 n.27. 
264 Id. (citation omitted). 
265 The Ninth Circuit recently relied on Environmental Defense Center in holding that a statute 
compelling non-ideological speech by drug claims processors to third-party insurers on 
the average fees pharmacies charge for drugs does not trigger any First Amendment scru-
tiny.  Jerry Beeman & Pharm. Servs., Inc. v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 652 F.3d 
1085, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, 661 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2011), question 
certified by 682 F.3d 779 (9th Cir. 2012). 
266 See, e.g., FUNG ET AL., supra note 1, at 12–13 (listing the purposes of workplace hazard dis-
closures, toxic releases disclosure, patient safety disclosures, drinking water contaminant 
!
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that looks to the context and content of the speech, and that analyzes 
the nature of the speech from the audience’s perspective, would 
permit courts to apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to regulations 
that compel non-ideological, informational speech outside of the 
confines of a buyer-seller relationship.267 
B. Disclosure Laws Targeting Pregnancy Service Centers 
New laws requiring “pregnancy service centers,”268 or facilities that 
provide services to women who are or may be pregnant, to disclose 
the scope and nature of their services present the courts with an op-
portunity to reconsider the definition of commercial speech.  These 
laws require the centers to provide factual information to women 
seeking pregnancy-related care about the services they provide 
and/or the presence of medically trained staff.  As will be discussed 
further below, the laws were adopted in response to evidence showing 
that women visiting the centers are often confused about what types 
of services the centers provide, and that this confusion can delay their 
access to time-sensitive medical care.  While these disclosures are de-
signed to provide information that will prevent the deception and 
confusion of women seeking pregnancy-related medical care, courts 
that have considered First Amendment challenges to the laws have 
concluded that the commercial speech doctrine is inapplicable based 
 
disclosures, restaurant hygiene disclosures, nutritional labeling disclosures, and automo-
bile rollover disclosures). 
267 Before turning to an application of the proposed definition, it is important to distinguish 
the commercial speech doctrine from the First Amendment right of corporations and 
other commercial actors to participate in public discourse.  The commercial speech defi-
nition focuses on the characteristics of a particular speech act, not the commercial status 
of its speaker.  See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 
(1980) (concluding that individuals seeking charitable contributions are engaged in fully 
protected speech, even though they are soliciting money).  Thus, while the government 
may not suppress political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity under Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010), this holding in no way limits the government’s 
ability to regulate a corporation’s speech promoting its products and services. 
268 These centers are commonly referred to in the media and by pro-choice advocates as “cri-
sis pregnancy centers.”  Although the centers used to refer to themselves as “crisis preg-
nancy centers,” they now avoid using the term, and some prefer the term “pregnancy re-
source center.”  MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 109TH CONG., FALSE 
AND MISLEADING HEALTH INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FEDERALLY FUNDED PREGNANCY 
RESOURCE CENTERS 1 (2006), available at http://www.chsourcebook.com/articles/ wax-
man2.pdf [hereinafter WAXMAN REPORT].  For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the 
centers as “pregnancy service centers,” which is the term used in the New York City Local 
Law.  N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-815.  The Baltimore Ordinance refers to these types 
of facilities as “limited-service pregnancy centers.”  BALT., MD., HEALTH CODE § 3-501 
(2012). 
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on a single characteristic:  the centers do not charge money for their 
services. 
1. The Background Behind Pregnancy Service Center Disclosure Laws 
Pregnancy service centers, as the term is used in this Article, are 
facilities that provide women who are or may be pregnant with cer-
tain services, such as free pregnancy tests, ultrasounds, counseling, 
maternity education, and free non-financial assistance (such as dia-
pers, formula, clothes, and toys).269  The centers often do not have 
any licensed medical providers on staff, and are not licensed as medi-
cal clinics.270  Most of the centers are affiliated with pro-life organiza-
tions,271 and they do not provide referrals for emergency contracep-
tion or abortions.  Their explicit goal is to persuade pregnant women 
and teenagers to choose motherhood or adoption over abortion.272 
These types of centers are neither a new nor a limited phenome-
non; it was estimated that there were approximately 2100 pregnancy 
service centers in the mid-1980s,273 and it is estimated that there are 
currently 2500 to 4000 such centers across the country.274  These types 
of centers have long been criticized for misrepresenting themselves as 
abortion clinics and engaging in deceptive advertising that leads 
women to believe that the centers provide a more full-range of medi-
cal services.275  And both governmental and private actors have previ-
ously attempted to curb the centers’ deceptive tactics.  As just a few 
examples:  New York State’s Attorney General charged centers with 
 
269 See, e.g., Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 202–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(listing the types of services provided by centers in New York City). 
270 NARAL PRO-CHOICE N.Y. FOUND., “SHE SAID ABORTION COULD CAUSE BREAST CANCER,” A 
REPORT ON:  THE LIES, MANIPULATIONS, AND PRIVACY VIOLATIONS OF CRISIS PREGNANCY 
CENTERS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.prochoiceny.org/
assets/bin/pdfs/cpcreport2010.pdf [hereinafter NARAL REPORT] (noting that most 
pregnancy service centers are not medical clinics and that most have staff without any 
medical training). 
271 WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 268, at 1.  Two of the largest of such national umbrella or-
ganizations are Heartbeat International and Care Net.  Both organizations describe 
themselves as pro-life networks that promote the work of pregnancy service centers 
providing alternatives to abortion.  See HEARTBEAT INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.hearbeatinternational.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2012); About Us, CARE NET, 
http://www.care-net.org/aboutus/mission.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). 
272 WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 268, at 1. 
273 See Joseph Berger, Centers’ Abortion Ads Called ‘Bogus,’ N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1986, at B2. 
274 Joanne Rosen, The Public Health Risks of Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 44 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & 
REPROD. HEALTH 201 (2012). 
275 See Jane Gross, Pregnancy Centers:  Anti-Abortion Role Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1987, at 
B1. 
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deceptive advertising in the 1980s276 and investigated their deceptive 
tactics again in 2002, entering into a settlement agreement;277 in the 
mid-1980s, a North Dakota women’s medical clinic sued a pregnancy 
service center for damages and injunctive relief on account of the 
center’s false and deceptive advertising;278 in the late 1980s, the State 
of Texas charged a center with violating the state’s deceptive trade 
practices act;279 in the late 1980s, a private plaintiff in Missouri sued a 
center under Section 1983 for participating in a conspiracy to deprive 
her of her fundamental right to an abortion;280 and in the mid-1990s, 
Planned Parenthood filed suit against a San Diego clinic for decep-
tive advertising.281 
Criticism of the centers’ deceptive tactics, however, has continued, 
culminating in a 2006 report by the Minority Staff of the Committee 
on Government Reform in the U.S. House of Representatives entitled 
“False and Misleading Health Information Provided by Federally 
Funded Pregnancy Resource Centers.”282  This report, requested by 
U.S. Representative Henry Waxman, found that 87% of the centers 
investigated “provided false or misleading information about the 
health effects of abortion,” and that the centers often “grossly mis-
represented the medical risks of abortion.”283  The report also de-
scribes how the centers “often mask their pro-life mission in order to 
attract abortion-vulnerable clients,” and that their tactics include “ob-
scuring the fact that the center does provide referrals to abortions” in 
their advertisements, and misrepresenting that the center will “pro-
vide pregnant teenagers and women with an understanding of all of 
their options.”284 
A host of other reports285 have provided further documentation of 
continued deception by crisis pregnancy centers.286  First, the centers 
 
276 Id. 
277 Nancy Tilghman, Anti-Abortion Centers Get Spitzer Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, at 7. 
278 Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1986). 
279 Mother & Unborn Baby Care of N. Tex. v. Texas, 749 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. App. 1988). 
280 Lewis v. Pearson Found., 908 F.2d 318, 319 (8th Cir. 1990). 
281 Tamar Lewin, Anti-Abortion Center’s Ads Ruled Misleading, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, at A15. 
282 WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 268. 
283 Id. at i. 
284 Id. at 1–2. 
285 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF N.Y.C., CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER SURVEYING SUMMARY (2011) 
[hereinafter PPNYC REPORT]; NARAL REPORT, supra note 270; NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, 
CRISIS PREGNANCY CTRS.:  AN AFFRONT TO CHOICE 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/public_policy/cpc_r
eport.pdf. 
286 See Rosen, supra note 274, at 201 (concluding that “the centers often provide inaccurate 
information that may delay or interfere with women’s access to abortion and contracep-
!
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disguise the true nature of the services they will provide in order to 
lure women to the clinic.  Second, once women are at the clinic, the 
centers provide them with false and misleading information.  For ex-
ample, the reports indicate that centers often have ambiguous names 
that confuse women about the nature of their services,287 locate next 
to abortion providers in the hopes that women seeking an abortion 
will accidentally go into the pregnancy services center,288 and even go 
so far as to intercept women on their way to abortion clinics to direct 
them to the pregnancy service center instead.289  Once women are at 
the clinic, the reports document that some centers have inaccurately 
diagnosed the stage of women’s pregnancies,290 given women false in-
formation about how long they could wait before deciding whether to 
have an abortion,291 and informed women that they will be able to ob-
tain an abortion at the pregnancy service center, without any inten-
tion of ever providing them with such a service.292 
In recent years, local governments have used a new tactic:  disclo-
sure laws that require pregnancy service centers to post signs and/or 
include written disclosures in their advertisements informing women 
about which services the centers will not provide, and/or whether the 
center is a licensed medical provider.  Laws requiring pregnancy ser-
vices centers to make some type of disclosure have been enacted in 
Baltimore, Maryland;293 Montgomery County, Maryland;294 New York 
City;295 and Austin, Texas.296 
 
tion, improperly influence women’s reproductive health decisions, and potentially in-
crease the number of unintended births”). 
287 NARAL REPORT, supra note 270, at 6 (giving the example of “neutral sounding names like 
Pregnancy Help, Inc., Pregnancy Resources Services, and Center for Pregnant Women”). 
288 Id. at 7–8. 
289 PPNYC REPORT, supra note 285, at 6–7. 
290 Id. at 5. 
291 NARAL REPORT, supra note 270, at 10–11. 
292 PPNYC REPORT, supra note 285, at 1 (reporting that 60% of respondents indicated that 
the pregnancy service center visited did not make clear whether the center provided 
abortions, and that “[a]t least two women reported being told that the CPC could per-
form an abortion, thereafter being made to wait for numerous weeks to find out that the 
CPC did not perform abortions”). 
293 BALT., MD., HEALTH CODE § 3-502 (2012). 
294 MONTGOMERY CNTY. COUNCIL, MD., RES. 16-1252 (2010).  This resolution requires “lim-
ited service pregnancy resource centers” to post a sign disclosing that the center does not 
have a licensed medical professional on staff, and that the Montgomery County health of-
ficer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed health 
care provider.  Id. 
295 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-816. 
296 AUSTIN, TEX., CODE § 10-9-2 (2010).  In April of 2010, the Austin City Council adopted 
this law, which requires “limited service pregnancy centers” to post a sign at their en-
trance informing visitors that the center does not provide for or refer for abortions or 
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2. Baltimore and New York City’s Disclosure Laws 
This Article will focus on the disclosure laws enacted in two cities:  
Baltimore and New York.  Pregnancy service centers challenged both 
cities’ laws on First Amendment grounds as impermissibly infringing 
on the centers’ right to free speech.  And in both cases, the district 
courts enjoined the laws, applying strict scrutiny after concluding that 
the commercial speech doctrine was inapplicable.297  While the New 
York City law is currently before the Second Circuit, the Fourth Cir-
cuit recently affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary in-
 
FDA-approved birth control drugs and medical devices.  In January of 2012, in response 
to a legal challenge to the ordinance, the City Council repealed this ordinance and re-
placed it with a new law that requires the centers to post a sign that indicates whether the 
center has a licensed health care practitioner that provides or supervises the provision of 
services, and whether the center is licensed to provide medical services.  AUSTIN, TEX., 
CODE § 10-10-2 (2011).  San Francisco has also adopted a law targeting pregnancy service 
centers, but San Francisco’s ordinance does not compel any speech.  Instead, San Fran-
cisco’s ordinance prohibits “limited services pregnancy centers” from engaging in un-
truthful or misleading advertising, and permits the San Francisco City Attorney to enforce 
its terms.  S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 93.4–5 (2011).  While not compelling any speech, 
San Francisco’s ordinance is still being challenged as an unconstitutional restriction of 
pregnancy service centers’ First Amendment rights.  See Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief at 2, First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, No. 11-5534 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011). 
297 Evergreen Ass’n Inc. v. New York, 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); O’Brien v. 
Mayor of Balt., 768 F. Supp. 2d 804, 813 (D. Md. 2011).  Montgomery County’s resolution 
was also challenged and preliminarily enjoined on First Amendment grounds.  See Tep-
eyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 779 F. Supp. 2d 456, 472 (D. Md. 2011).  In Tepeyac the County 
defendants did not take a definitive position in the litigation as to whether the resolution 
applied to commercial speech.  The district court’s commercial speech analysis in Tepeyac 
is similar to the analysis in the Baltimore and New York decisions, and will not be dis-
cussed at length.  The court applied strict scrutiny after concluding that the centers were 
not engaged in commercial speech.  Importantly, while applying strict scrutiny, the dis-
trict court did not preliminarily enjoin the resolution’s requirement that the centers post 
a sign indicating that the center does not have a licensed medical professional on staff, 
but did enjoin the requirement that the centers post a sign informing women that the 
County Health Officer recommends that pregnant women contact a licensed medical 
professional.  The court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the first dis-
closure requirement violated strict scrutiny.  Id. at 471–72.  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed in part, and reversed in part.  Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 683 F.3d 591 (4th 
Cir. 2012).  The majority of the Fourth Circuit panel concluded that both parts of the 
Montgomery County resolution should have been preliminarily enjoined, as even the 
statement about the presence of a medical professional violated strict scrutiny.  In the ma-
jority’s view, this disclaimer “suggests to potential clients that the center is not to be trust-
ed and that a pregnancy center’s services, like religious counseling or job placement assis-
tance, will usually be inferior to those offered by medical professionals.”  Id. at 594. 
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junction, over a vigorous dissent by Judge King.298  The Fourth Cir-
cuit’s decision will be reheard en banc later this year.299 
First, a brief summary of each law.  Baltimore’s law applies to “lim-
ited-service pregnancy centers,” defined as “any person . . . whose 
primary purpose is to provide pregnancy-related services,”300 and who 
provides information about pregnancy-related services but does not 
provide or refer for (1) abortions, or (2) nondirective and compre-
hensive birth control services.301  The city requires all centers meeting 
this definition to post a sign in their waiting room that informs  cli-
ents that “the center does not provide or make referral for abortion 
or birth-control services.”302 
New York City’s ordinance applies to facilities that have a primary 
purpose of providing services to women who are or may be pregnant, 
and that either (1) offer obstetric ultrasounds, sonograms, or prena-
tal care,303 or (2) have the appearance of being a licensed medical fa-
cility.304  The ordinance lists six factors that courts should consider in 
evaluating whether a pregnancy service center has the appearance of 
a licensed medical facility.  The factors to be considered are whether 
the pregnancy service center: 
(a) offers pregnancy testing and/or pregnancy diagnosis; (b) has staff or 
volunteers who wear medical attire or uniforms; (c) contains one or 
more examination tables; (d) contains a private or semi-private room or 
area containing medical supplies and/or medical instruments; (e) has 
staff or volunteers who collect health insurance information from clients; 
and (f) is located on the same premises as a licensed medical facility or 
provider or shares facility space with a licensed medical provider.305 
If a given facility meets two or more of these factors, the ordinance 
declares this to be prima facie evidence that the center has the ap-
pearance of a licensed medical facility.  The ordinance explicitly does 
not apply to any facility that is actually licensed to provide medical 
 
298 Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 683 F.3d 539, 560 (4th 
Cir. 2012). 
299 Court Order, Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 683 F.3d 543 (Nos. 11-1111, 11-
1185) (Dkt. No. 120) (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 2012) (granting rehearing en banc and schedul-
ing oral argument for Dec. of 2012). 
300 BALT., MD., HEALTH CODE § 3-501 (2012). 
301 Id. 
302 Id. at § 3-502(A). 
303 Prenatal care is defined in explicitly medical terms:  “services consisting of physical exam-
ination, pelvic examination or clinical laboratory services provided to a woman during 
pregnancy.”  N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-815(i). 
304 Id. at § 20-815(g). 
305 Id. 
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care, or that has a licensed medical provider present to provide or 
supervise the provision of services.306 
A facility meeting the New York city ordinance’s definition must 
disclose whether the center has a licensed medical provider on staff; 
whether the center provides or refers for abortions, emergency con-
traception and prenatal care; and that the NYC Department of 
Health recommends that women who are or may be pregnant contact 
a licensed medical professional.307  These disclosures must be made:  
(1) on a sign in the entranceway and waiting room of the center; (2) 
in any of the center’s advertisements; and (3) orally to any woman 
who requests an abortion, emergency contraception, or prenatal 
care.308 
Thus, while Baltimore’s law imposes a more modest disclosure re-
quirement, both in its content and format, New York City’s applies to 
a more limited set of centers, those that provide medical-type services 
or otherwise have the appearance of being a licensed medical facility, 
but that are not actually licensed as medical clinics. 
3. The Courts’ Commercial Speech Analysis 
In determining whether the centers were engaged in commercial 
speech, both district courts and the majority of the Fourth Circuit 
panel cited to Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. as holding that 
commercial speech is speech that “does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction,”309 and to Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. 
v. Public Service Commission’s310 definition of commercial speech as 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker 
and its audience.”311 
 
306 Id. 
307 Id. at § 20-816. 
308 Id. 
309 Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quot-
ing Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  See also Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 
683 F.3d 539, 553 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 
60, 66 (1983)) (stating that the “hallmark” of commercial speech is that it does “no more 
than propose a commercial transaction”); O’Brien v. Mayor of Balt., 768 F. Supp. 2d 804, 
813 (D. Md. 2011) (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 64–68) (“The Supreme Court has defined 
commercial speech as speech that proposes a commercial transaction.”). 
310 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
311 Evergreen Ass’n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (quoting Conn. Bar Ass’n, 620 F.3d at 94) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  See also Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, 683 F.3d at 553 
(quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servs. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980)); O’Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 813 (quoting Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 561). 
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These courts, however, completely ignored the Supreme Court’s 
discussion in Bolger of the factors bearing on whether a certain speech 
act qualifies as commercial speech:  whether the speech is an adver-
tisement, whether the speech refers to a specific product, and wheth-
er the speakers have an economic motivation for engaging in the 
speech.312  Instead, the courts focused their analysis on one fact:   the 
centers’ lack of financial interest or motivation.  As the O’Brien Dis-
trict Court said in evaluating Baltimore’s law: 
The overall purpose of the advertisements, services, and information of-
fered by the CENTER is not to propose a commercial transaction, nor is 
it related to the CENTER’s economic interest.  The CENTER engages in 
speech relating to abortion and birth-control based on strongly held reli-
gious and political beliefs rather than commercial interests or profit mo-
tives.313 
The majority of the Fourth Circuit panel in Greater Baltimore agreed 
with the district court’s analysis, concluding that while the fact that 
the centers provide free services is not necessarily dispositive: 
[I]t becomes so in this case because there is no indication that the Preg-
nancy Center is motivated by any economic interest or that it is propos-
ing any commercial transaction.  The Pregnancy Center seeks to provide 
free information about pregnancy, abortion, and birth control as in-
formed by a religious and political belief.  This kind of ideologically driv-
en speech has routinely been afforded the highest levels of First 
Amendment protection . . . .314 
The district court drew a similar conclusion in analyzing New York’s 
law:  “the offer of free services such as pregnancy tests in furtherance 
of a religious belief does not propose a commercial transac-
tion . . . . [n]or do Plaintiffs offer pregnancy-related services in fur-
therance of their economic interests.”315  According to these courts, 
since the operators of the pregnancy service centers intend and be-
lieve themselves to be engaging in religious speech, their speech is 
per se non-commercial. 
By solely focusing on the underlying religious and ideological mo-
tivations of the pregnancy service centers, the courts have failed to 
appreciate, or even consider, the perspective of the audience for the 
centers’ speech:  women who are or may be pregnant.  For women 
seeking pregnancy-related services, the centers are a service-provider 
competing with other organizations, including full-service medical 
clinics, that very likely do charge a fee for their services.  These courts 
 
312 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–67. 
313 O’Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 813. 
314 Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, 683 F.3d at 553–54. 
315 Evergreen Ass’n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 205. 
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dismissed the relevance of the fact that the services provided by the 
centers “have value in the commercial marketplace,”316 concluding 
that such reasoning would mean that “any house of worship offering 
their congregants sacramental wine, communion wafers, prayer 
beads, or other objects with commercial value, would find their ac-
companying speech subject to diminished constitutional protec-
tion.”317  However, there is an important distinction between churches 
offering their congregants items that have a commercial value during 
religious services and pregnancy service centers offering to provide 
women with pregnancy tests, ultrasounds, and options counseling:  
individuals do not go to church to get wine, and if they do, they are 
well-aware that the wine will be served alongside a heavy dose of reli-
gious speech.  In contrast, women who visit pregnancy service centers 
are, in many cases, unaware of the centers’ religious motivations and 
are visiting the centers in order to receive the services advertised. 
The fact that speech is religiously motivated does not mean that 
such speech should be completely immunized from state regulation 
or judicial review.  While the First Amendment prohibits the state 
from regulating one’s religious beliefs, it does not protect fraudulent 
or criminal speech,318 even if it is religiously motivated.319  Looking to 
the Court’s jurisprudence under the Free Exercise Clause, “an indi-
vidual’s religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with 
an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to 
regulate.”320  An organization’s religious motivations do not mean that 
it can engage in fraud or violate valid laws prohibiting fraudulent and 
criminal conduct.  Nor should a group’s religious motivations mean 
that all of its speech, even speech promoting the use of a product 
 
316 O’Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 813.  See also Evergreen Ass’n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (citing Bol-
ger, 463 U.S. at 67) (“[A]n organization does not propose a ‘commercial transaction’ 
simply by offering a good or service that has economic value.”). 
317 O’Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 814.  See also Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, 683 
F.3d at 554; Evergreen Ass’n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (quoting O’Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 
814). 
318 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547–48 (2012) (discussing historical exclu-
sions of First Amendment protection for fraudulent or criminal speech that results in a 
legally cognizable harm); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1580 (2010) (“Since its 
enactment, the First Amendment has permitted restrictions on a few historic categories of 
speech—including obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to crim-
inal conduct . . . .”) (citations omitted); Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 
538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud.”). 
319 See, e.g., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass’n for the Unification of World Christianity, 762 P.2d 46, 
57–58 (Cal. 1988) (collecting cases imposing tort liability for religiously motivated con-
duct). 
320 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990). 
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with commercial value, is per se religious speech that lies outside the 
commercial speech doctrine.   
Consider the following hypotheticals:  A religious group that seeks 
to convert vegetarians into meat-eaters as part of the group’s religious 
mission opens a non-profit organization, next to a vegetarian super-
market, called “Just Like Meat” and gives away free “hot dogs” that 
are advertised on its signs as tasting “Just Like the Real Thing!”  How-
ever, the hot dogs taste just like the real thing because they are made 
with beef.  Suppose a state had evidence that many vegetarians were 
mislead into thinking that the free hot dogs were made with an imita-
tion meat product and were deeply distraught and angered when 
they found out that the group was giving out hot dogs made with 
beef.  Or, to take the analogy even further, suppose the state also had 
evidence that individuals who were allergic to beef had ingested the 
hot dogs and had suffered severe allergic reactions as a consequence.  
Should the state be prohibited from requiring the store to post a sign 
indicating that the store serves products made with real meat merely 
because the group’s conduct is religiously motivated and the hot dogs 
are given away for free? 
What if a religious group opposed to blood transfusions set up a 
non-profit organization called the “Sickle Cell Anemia Treatments 
Options Center” that advertised itself as providing counseling, sup-
port, and medical services to those with sickle cell anemia, and that 
appeared to most visitors to be a medical clinic?  Suppose this organi-
zation did not have any actual medical providers on staff, counseled 
all clients that blood transfusions would only harm their health, and 
showed clients shocking photos and videos of death and disease 
caused by blood transfusions.  Suppose that some visitors to the or-
ganization believed that they had visited a medical clinic and delayed 
in getting necessary medical treatment as a result.  Does the fact that 
the organization does not charge for its services mean that its speech 
is per se non-commercial?  Should the state be prohibited from re-
quiring the “Sickle Cell Anemia Treatments Options Center” to post 
a sign informing potential visitors that the center is not a licensed 
medical clinic, and does not provide blood transfusions?  In both of 
these hypotheticals, the audience for the speech is unaware of the 
underlying religious motivations and believes that the organization 





Nov. 2012] COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH 605 
 
4. A More In-Depth Commercial Speech Analysis 
As discussed previously, the Court has not given a clear method 
for analyzing whether a particular speech act qualifies as commercial 
speech.  The pregnancy service center disclosure laws, which assured-
ly affect speech that lies outside the range of the “core notion of 
commercial speech,”321 challenge the courts to grapple with this doc-
trine and its nuances.  Unfortunately, the courts discussed above en-
gaged in a cursory and superficial analysis of whether the centers’ 
speech met the Court’s definition.  By undertaking a more in-depth 
analysis of whether the commercial speech doctrine applies to the 
pregnancy service center disclosure laws, I hope, in this section, to 
identify a workable method of identifying commercial speech that 
can be applied in a wide variety of contexts. 
This is not to say that a precise set of finite characteristics must be 
present in order for something to qualify as commercial speech.  As 
Dean Post notes, “the impossibility of specifying the parameters that 
define the category of commercial speech has haunted its jurispru-
dence and scholarship,”322 and I do not suggest that commercial 
speech has easily identifiable attributes.  Instead, I believe that a mul-
ti-factor approach, such as that advocated in Bolger, is necessary in or-
der to ensure that the doctrine targets the appropriate speech acts.  I 
propose a test that incorporates the Bolger factors and asks the courts 
to analyze the speech’s context and content, as well as the perspective 
of the reasonable person receiving the communication.  Such a test 
recognizes that since the First Amendment values and protects the 
informational interests of the audience of commercial speech, the 
definition of what qualifies as commercial speech should take the au-
dience’s perspective into account.  In order to determine whether a 
particular speech act qualifies as commercial speech, the courts 
should analyze:  (1) the content of the speech:  whether the speech 
proposes a commercial transaction, and/or refers to the use of a par-
ticular product or service; and (2) the context of the speech:  wheth-
er the speech is in the commercial marketplace or is instead part of 
public discourse, the commercial interests of the speaker, the rela-
tionship between the speaker and the audience, and the reasonable 
audience member’s perspective on the speech’s context.323  An organ-
ization that desires to spread a religious or political message should 
 
321 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66. 
322 Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 7. 
323 This proposed test for how to define commercial speech is not limited to laws that com-
pel commercial speech, although that will be my focus in this article. 
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not be able to disguise the social meaning of its speech by pretending 
to be a commercial actor while simultaneously claiming that this 
speech rests outside the commercial speech doctrine. 
This approach aligns with that taken by Judge King in his dissent-
ing opinion in the Fourth Circuit’s review of the Baltimore ordi-
nance.  Judge King noted the Court’s historical difficulty in defining 
commercial speech,324 and looked specifically to the Court’s discus-
sion in Bolger of the multiple factors that must be considered when 
evaluating whether a given speech act qualifies as commercial 
speech.325  Importantly, Judge King made clear that “context mat-
ters”326 when engaging in this inquiry, and that “[f]rom a First 
Amendment free speech perspective, that context includes the view-
point of the listener, for ‘[c]ommercial expression not only serves the 
economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and fur-
thers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of in-
formation.’”327  In short, Judge King advocated the exact kind of con-
textual inquiry presented in this Article, and the Fourth Circuit may 
well adopt Judge King’s preferred approach when it rehears the case 
en banc.328 
Applying this kind of contextual inquiry to the pregnancy service 
center disclosure laws illustrates the inadequacy of relying on a single 
factor, the speaker’s economic motivation, in defining what consti-
tutes commercial speech.  The commercial nature of the pregnancy 
service centers’ speech becomes much more complicated when one 
engages in a more three-dimensional inquiry. 
a. The Content of the Speech 
By first evaluating the actual content of the speech at issue, we can 
focus in on the speech act, as opposed to the motivations of the 
speaker.  Speech that proposes a commercial transaction, rather than 
expressing the speaker’s ideological beliefs, evokes the Court’s con-
ception of core commercial speech.329  In Zauderer, the Court notes 
 
324 Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 683 F.3d 539, 567 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (King, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court has long grappled with the con-
cept of commercial speech.”). 
325 Id. at 568. 
326 Id. at 569. 
327 Id. (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–62 
(1980)). 
328 See Court Order, Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 683 F.3d 543 (Nos. 11-1111, 
11-1185) (Dkt. No. 120) (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 2012) (granting rehearing en banc and sched-
uling oral argument for Dec. of 2012). 
329 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983). 
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that while it is difficult to identify the precise boundaries of the 
commercial speech definition, “it is clear enough that the speech at 
issue in this case—advertising pure and simple—falls within those 
bounds.”330  But speech need not take the form of a traditional com-
mercial advertisement in order for it to qualify as commercial speech.  
In Bolger, the Court held that the “reference to a specific product”331 
was one of the factors weighing in favor of classifying the speech at 
issue as commercial speech.332  Thus, while the mere reference to a 
given product clearly does not commercialize a given speech act, this 
is still relevant to the analysis.  And by focusing on the content of the 
speech, we can determine how the reasonable audience member 
would interpret the speech regardless of the speaker’s motivations for 
engaging in the speech. 
Looking to the content of the pregnancy service centers’ speech, 
we must first determine whether the compelled speech requirements 
impact the centers’ ideological speech, or just their offer of services.  
The content of the centers’ speech when meeting with women is of-
ten overtly ideological:  the center staff and volunteers engage in ad-
vocacy expressing their opposition to abortion and birth control.  
However, the disclosure laws apply to a more limited aspect of the 
centers’ speech.  Both Baltimore’s and New York’s laws require dis-
closures, in the form of signs, to be placed in the centers’ waiting 
rooms.333  New York’s law goes further, requiring the disclosures to be 
included in the centers’ advertisements, and requiring a second sign 
outside the pregnancy service center.334  All of these requirements 
impact the centers’ speech offering services, not the centers’ speech 
once a woman is meeting with a staff member.335  The disclosure re-
quirement does not affect the centers’ ability to engage in ideological 
 
330 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985).  In Virginia Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, the Court describes commercial advertising 
as the “dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for 
what reason, and at what price.”  425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). 
331 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66. 
332 See id. (noting that the reference to a specific product was one of the “characteristics” 
supporting the classification of the speech at issue as commercial speech); see also Va. Bd. 
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (stating that ordinarily in commercial speech, “the ad-
vertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service”). 
333 BALT., MD., HEALTH CODE § 3-502(a) (2012); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-816 
(f)(1)(ii). 
334 Id. at (f)(1)(i), (f)(1)(iii). 
335 New York’s law has one additional requirement that goes further, requiring the disclo-
sures to be made if a woman requests birth control, an abortion, or prenatal care.  N.Y.C., 
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-816 (f)(2).  This particular requirement will be discussed infra pp. 
612–13. 
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advocacy.  Thus, in evaluating the content of the centers’ speech, the 
analysis should focus on the centers’ speech offering services to wom-
en who are or may be pregnant. 
Looking to New York’s requirement that the centers include the 
disclosure in their advertisements, it is clear that the content of the 
centers’ advertisements falls within the ‘core notion’ of commercial 
speech:  the advertisements offer the availability of particular services.  
Although these services may be provided free of charge, the adver-
tisements are otherwise indistinguishable from an advertisement by 
any service-provider.  The advertisements do not spread the centers’ 
ideological or religious messages, nor do the advertisements discuss a 
matter of public concern:336  the advertisements inform women who 
are or may be pregnant of the availability of certain services at the 
pregnancy service center.  The content of the advertisements weighs 
in favor of classifying the centers’ speech as commercial speech. 
A more complicated question is posed by the signage disclosure 
requirements, which affect the centers’ general offer of services, 
without targeting a specific speech act per se.  The signage require-
ments are somewhat analogous to compelled labeling on product 
packaging:  the pregnancy service center is being required to carry a 
label informing potential clients of the services provided.  Moreover, 
the signage disclosure requirements can be tied to the centers’ own 
signage, which informs women of the name and location of the preg-
nancy service center.  To the extent that the centers’ name and sign-
age represent the center as a medical service-provider, rather than an 
entity with an ideological mission, the content of this speech is also 
commercial.  The Court has previously held that a trade name quali-
fies as commercial speech,337 and the evidence suggests that many 
centers use ambiguous names that do not convey the limited nature 
of their services.338  Although New York contains the additional re-
quirement that disclosures be made orally upon the request of cer-
tain services, again the content of the speech that is being affected is 
the request and offer of services, not the centers’ ideological speech. 
 
336 Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (holding that an advertisement 
that “communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested 
claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence 
and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern” did not qualify as a 
commercial advertisement). 
337 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (holding that optometrists’ use of trade names 
qualified as commercial speech and could be regulated by the state because of the “signif-
icant possibility that trade names will be used to mislead the public”). 
338 NARAL REPORT, supra note 270, at 6. 
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b. The Context of the Speech 
The format and forum of a particular speech act matters, as does 
the identity of the speaker and his audience, and the nature of their 
relationship.  In fact, the Court has given us an example of how to 
evaluate whether a given speech act’s context indicates that it is 
commercial speech.  In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,339 a case that predates 
the commercial speech doctrine, the Court engaged in a contextual 
inquiry in evaluating whether Jehovah’s Witnesses were engaged in 
commercial speech when they went door–to–door explaining their 
religious views and soliciting people to purchase religious books and 
pamphlets for less than twenty-five cents:340 
[T]he mere fact that the religious literature is “sold” by itinerant preach-
ers rather than ‘donated’ does not transform evangelism into a commer-
cial enterprise.  If it did, then the passing of the collection plate in 
church would make the church service a commercial project.  The con-
stitutional rights of those spreading their religious beliefs through the 
spoken and printed word are not to be gauged by standards governing 
retailers or wholesalers of books . . . On this record it plainly cannot be 
said that petitioners were engaged in a commercial rather than a reli-
gious venture.341 
As Dean Post notes, the Court’s analysis in Murdock “does not focus 
on the narrow communicative act of selling a Bible, but rather on the 
larger ‘venture’ or ‘activity’ within which the particular communica-
tive act is embedded.”342  The Court looks to the social meaning of the 
type of speech at issue:  “The hand distribution of religious tracts is 
an age-old form of missionary evangelism. . . . It is more than preach-
ing.  It is more than distribution of religious literature.  It is a combi-
nation of both.”343  The speech at issue was deeply tied to religious 
practices—it would be clear to any listener that the solicitation was 
part of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious mission.  Importantly, the 
Court does not simply conclude that the speech is religious because 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses themselves intend to engage in religious 
speech.  Instead, the Court’s language evokes its later characteriza-
tion of the “commonsense” distinctions between commercial speech 
and other speech.344  In Murdock, a commonsense analysis of the 
 
339 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
340 The books were twenty-five cents each, and the pamphlets were five cents each.  Id. at 
107. 
341 Id. at 110–11. 
342 Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 16. 
343 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 108–09. 
344 See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (“We have not dis-
carded the ‘commonsense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transac-
!
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speech, given its context and format, indicated that the speech was 
fundamentally different from a door-to-door salesman advocating the 
purchase of a particular book. 
Consider, for example, if the Jehovah’s Witnesses had instead 
concealed their religion from their listeners and simply offered to sell 
them “self-help” books for twenty-five cents.  While the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses’ ultimate motivation for speaking might still be religious in 
this hypothetical scenario, the alteration of the circumstances sur-
rounding their speech would assuredly have affected the Court’s 
analysis of whether the Jehovah’s Witnesses were engaged in religious 
speech.  The Court’s reasoning in Murdock makes clear that 
“[c]onstitutional characterization of the act of solicitation depends 
on its context.”345 
If we evaluate the context and social meaning of the pregnancy 
service centers’ speech, instead of simply focusing on the centers’ 
lack of financial motivation, the analysis looks much different from 
that undertaken by both district courts and the Fourth Circuit panel 
majority.  The offer of pregnancy testing, ultrasounds, or pregnancy 
counseling is not, in Murdock’s terms, a “clearly religious activity.”346  
The context of this speech, irrespective of whether any money is 
charged, is one of service-provision.  Many other institutions, such as 
full-service medical clinics, provide the same services.347  In fact, some 
medical clinics also provide pregnancy tests free of charge.348  The 
pregnancy service centers are acting like any other service provider:  
their speech targets a specific audience, women who are or may be 
pregnant, and offers the availability of certain services that have an 
economic value in the marketplace.  The evidence suggests that 
women visiting the centers often believe that they are visiting a medi-
cal clinic, and are unaware that the centers have ideological motiva-
tions for providing women with pregnancy-related services.349  While 
the pregnancy service centers’ lack of economic motivation is rele-
 
tion, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other 
varieties of speech.”). 
345 Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 16. 
346 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 111. 
347 See, e.g., Health Info & Services, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.planned
parenthood.org/health-center/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) (describing services provided 
by Planned Parenthood). 
348 See Health Info & Services:  Boro Hall Center—Brooklyn, NY, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-center/centerDetails.asp?f=2522&a=0&
v=details (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) (“Free pregnancy tests by walk-in or appoint-
ment . . . .”). 
349 See, e.g., PPNYC REPORT, supra note 285, at 3–6 (reporting stories of women who mistak-
enly went to pregnancy service centers). 
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vant,350 the overall context of the speech is still the offer of services in 
the commercial marketplace, not ideological speech in public dis-
course. 
If the pregnancy service centers, however, did actually make clear 
in their advertisements and signage that their central goal is to en-
gage in religious and ideological advocacy about the sanctity of hu-
man life, this would assuredly affect the contextual analysis of their 
speech, as this would affect the audience’s perspective on whether 
the centers are just another service provider.  If pregnancy service 
centers were clear about their motivations, the audience for their 
speech would be aware that the pregnancy service centers are not just 
providing services to pregnant women, and that the centers intend to 
advocate their ideological beliefs.  Thus, in the contextual analysis, 
the visibility of the centers’ ideological motivations to its audience 
matters, not just what the centers claim their motivations to be.  It is 
the disguising of the centers’ religious and ideological motivations 
that weighs in favor of classifying their speech as commercial speech. 
The centers’ efforts to engage in religious and ideological speech 
are certainly relevant to the commercial speech analysis.  As the 
Court said in Riley, “[o]ur lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny 
to apply to a compelled statement must be the nature of the speech 
taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement there-
on.”351  Here, however, the disclosures do not impact the centers’ abil-
ity to engage in ideological advocacy.352  The disclosures merely in-
 
350 For example, the Court has made clear that a speaker who does have economic motiva-
tions for engaging in speech cannot immunize his speech from the commercial speech 
doctrine by “including reference to public issues.”  Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods. Corp., 
463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983). 
351 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). 
352 The District of Maryland, without much analysis, concluded that the mandated signage 
meant that “[c]ontemporaneous with the center’s initial communication is the presence 
of a stark and immediate statement about abortion and birth control,” and that this 
statement “alters the course of a center’s communications with a client or prospective cli-
ent about abortion and birth-control.”  O’Brien v. Mayor of Balt., 768 F. Supp. 2d 804, 
814 (D. Md. 2011).  It is unclear how the statement that these services are not provided in 
any way alters the centers’ ability to convey their ideological message.  In fact, one study 
has found that informing women about the ideology of a pro-life center, which goes 
much further than the New York and Baltimore requirements that the centers inform 
women about the scope of their services, had no effect on women’s decision-making.  
Kathryn Mardirosian et al., The Effects of Enhanced Informed Consent in a Pro-Life Pregnancy 
Counseling Center, 69 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 39, 40 (1990).  This study examined the effects 
of telling women that the center they were visiting was pro-life, that the counselors and 
staff advocated a pro-life philosophy, that they might be shown a graphic videotape of an 
abortion, and that staff members were trained volunteers and not professional counse-
lors.  A control group was not told any of this information.  The study found no signifi-
!
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form women what services they will be unable to receive at the center, 
curing any misconceptions they may have had about the types of ser-
vices provided.353  In contrast, in Riley, the Court concluded that the 
law requiring professional fundraisers to disclose the percentage they 
retained as a fee was inextricably intertwined with the fundraiser’s 
ideological advocacy because of the “reality that without solicitation 
the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.”354  The 
collection and solicitation of money at issue in Riley was integral to 
the charitable organizations’ ability to engage in advocacy, and the 
Court concluded that the ordinance would “almost certainly hamper 
the legitimate efforts of professional fundraisers to raise money for 
the charities they represent.”355  Here, however, the disclosures only 
prevent the centers from engaging in illegitimate efforts:  the centers 
cannot mislead women into thinking that they are visiting a medical 
clinic that provides abortions or emergency contraception.  There is 
nothing inextricable about the centers’ offer to provide pregnancy-
related services and their ideological advocacy.356 Thus, analyzing the 
effect of the compelled statements on the centers’ speech as a whole 
suggests that the laws only impact the commercial aspect of the cen-
ters’ speech. 
New York’s law, however, contains an additional requirement that 
impacts the centers’ one-on-one conversations with individual wom-
 
cant difference between the groups in their intent to abort after the meeting with the 
pro-life counselors. 
353 This discussion is limited to the Baltimore ordinance and the first two disclosures re-
quired by New York City’s ordinance.  The third disclosure required by the New York or-
dinance, that the New York City Department of Health recommends that women who are 
or may be pregnant contact a licensed medical professional, goes beyond merely correct-
ing misconceptions about the services the centers provide.  I will discuss New York City’s 
third disclosure in more detail in the next section.  Building off of the analysis of the 
graphic tobacco labels, I conclude that the third disclosure requires the centers to repeat 
the state’s normative message, and thus falls outside of “factual and uncontroversial in-
formation.”  N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-816. 
354 Riley, 487 U.S. at 796. 
355 Id. at 799. 
356 The Court reached a similar conclusion in analyzing whether Tupperware parties that 
included discussions of home economics and financial responsibility qualified as com-
mercial speech.  The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, based on Riley, that the 
noncommercial aspects of the presentations were intertwined with the commercial as-
pects:  “there is nothing whatever ‘inextricable’ about the noncommercial aspects of the-
se presentations. No law of man or of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares with-
out teaching home economics, or to teach home economics without selling housewares.  
Nothing in the resolution prevents the speaker from conveying, or the audience from 
hearing, these noncommercial messages, and nothing in the nature of things requires 
them to be combined with commercial messages.”  Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. 
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989). 
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en:  the centers must also make the mandated disclosures orally if a 
woman requests an abortion, emergency contraception, or prenatal 
care.357  The ordinance makes clear that the disclosure must be made 
whenever a client or prospective client makes such an oral request for 
these services, whether in person or on the phone.358  While the oral 
disclosures, in the context of a telephone conversation with a pro-
spective client, target the same “offer of services” discussed previous-
ly, a staff member will also be required to make these disclosures if a 
woman requests these services during her appointment.  The oral 
disclosure, therefore, may have to be said alongside the centers’ ideo-
logical speech, and while the content of this speech is commercial, 
the context of the speech is much more ideological once a woman is 
meeting with the centers’ staff.  While this requirement poses a closer 
question, analyzing the impact of the compelled statement on the 
centers’ ideological speech leads to the same conclusion reached 
above:  the compelled speech prevents the centers from lying about 
which services are provided and whether a medical provider is on 
staff.  Presumably, any woman who requests these services during her 
appointment is under the mistaken impression that she is in the of-
fice of a non-ideologically motivated medical service provider.  The 
disclosure still targets the centers’ offer of services by requiring staff 
members to provide additional information about which services are 
provided—the disclosure in no way impacts the content of the cen-
ters’ ideological speech. 
In summary, a more nuanced analysis of the pregnancy service 
centers’ speech leads to the conclusion that the New York City and 
Baltimore disclosure laws apply to commercial speech. 
5. Zauderer’s Rational Basis Test 
Before considering how Zauderer’s rational basis test would apply 
to Baltimore’s and New York City’s laws, it is necessary to consider the 
requirement discussed in Part IV that the disclosure compel factual 
rather than normative speech.  Although the disclosures informing 
women whether a medical professional is on staff and whether cer-
tain services are provided compel purely factual statements, the third 
disclosure required by New York City’s ordinance compels normative 
speech.  The third disclosure, which requires the centers to disclose 
that the New York City Department of Health recommends that 
 
357 See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-816. 
358 Id. 
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women who are or may be pregnant consult a licensed medical pro-
vider,359 requires pregnancy service centers to act as a billboard for 
the city’s normative message about how pregnant women should be-
have.360  While the disclosure explicitly indicates that the recommen-
dation comes from the New York City Department of Health, and 
thus does not require the centers to present the recommendation as 
though it is their own opinion, this disclosure still interferes with the 
centers’ autonomy interests by forcing the centers to spread the gov-
ernment’s message.361  As a consequence, New York City’s third dis-
closure falls outside of Zauderer, and should be subject to Central Hud-
son’s intermediate level of scrutiny. 
Rational basis review does apply, however, to the ordinances’ re-
maining disclosure requirements.  In contrast to the visual tobacco 
labels, these compelled disclosures are purely factual:  they require 
the centers to disclose which services are provided, and in the case of 
New York City, whether a medical provider is on staff.  Informing 
women what services are provided at a pregnancy service center does 
not require the centers to spread any type of normative government 
message as their own.362  Both New York City’s and Baltimore’s laws 
are rationally related to each city’s interest in curing consumer de-
ception and confusion about the scope of services that these centers 
provide, thus meeting even a narrow reading of the permissible state 
interests under Zauderer.363  The Southern District of New York, in 
 
359 Id. 
360 Here, the normative nature of this speech is evident on the face of the disclosure.  Ac-
cordingly, there is no need to look to the government’s purpose in mandating the disclo-
sure. 
361 For example, in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977), it was equally clear that the 
state motto on New Hampshire’s license plates was a mandated state message, and not 
the opinion of individual drivers.  Id. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
format of state license plates is “known to all as having been prescribed by the State”).  
The requirement that the plaintiffs display the license plate, however, still offended their 
autonomy interests by requiring them to “use their private property as a ‘mobile bill-
board’ for the State’s ideological message . . . [and] display ‘Live Free or Die’ to hun-
dreds of people each day.”  Id. at 715.  Cf. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 
Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 576 (1995) (“[W]hen dissemination of a view contrary to 
one’s own is forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the communication ad-
vanced, the speaker’s right to autonomy over the message is compromised.”). 
362 Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. New York, 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (characteriz-
ing New York City’s law as mandating “only factual disclosures”). 
363 Moreover, as the Southern District of New York recognized, deception is not the only val-
ue at stake.  The disclosures serve the city’s significant interest in protecting public 
health:  “the prevention of deception related to reproductive health care is of paramount 
importance.  Lack of transparency and delay in prenatal care can gravely impact a wom-
an’s health.”  Id. at 207.  Thus, given the discussion in Part III of the broad range of state 
interests justifying compelled disclosures, the city’s interest in informing women in the 
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fact, recognized the extent of the centers’ deceptive practices:  
“[p]laintiff’s categorical denial of the existence of any such decep-
tion—and refusal to acknowledge the potential misleading nature of 
certain conduct—feigns ignorance of the obvious.”364  Once the prin-
ciples of the compelled commercial speech doctrine are applied to 
the pregnancy service center disclosure laws, the laws’ constitutionali-
ty is easily established. 
Given that the commercial speech doctrine seeks to protect the 
informational interests of its audience, the definition of commercial 
speech should not rely solely on the intentions and motivations of the 
speaker.  The analysis of the context and content of the pregnancy 
service centers’ speech demonstrates the need to engage in a more 
searching inquiry in determining what qualifies as commercial 
speech in order to ensure that the pertinent interests are being 
served. 
CONCLUSION 
Although information disclosure policies have proliferated over 
the past twenty-seven years, the Court has given little consideration to 
the scope of Zauderer.  If rational basis scrutiny only applied to com-
pelled commercial speech that (1) proposes a commercial transac-
tion, and (2) cures consumer deception, a large number of disclo-
sures would violate the First Amendment.  My proposed test, which 
requires a more nuanced analysis of what qualifies as commercial 
speech, and which recognizes the breadth of state interests justifying 
compelled speech as well as the distinction between factual and nor-
mative speech, sets forth a more workable method for analyzing the 
First Amendment implications of compelled commercial speech. 
The recent developments in the case law illustrate the inability of 
the current doctrine to provide the lower courts with the tools to bal-
ance speakers’ First Amendment rights against the state’s substantial 
interests.  On one side of the spectrum, we see completely factual dis-
closures informing women about the types of services provided at a 
clinic targeting pregnant women being enjoined simply because the 
clinics do not charge a fee for their services.  If these clinics were for-
profit institutions charging a fee, the disclosures would raise few First 
Amendment concerns.  On the other side, we have gruesome images 
of the consequences of tobacco addiction being injected into the very 
 
interest of public health could serve as an independent basis for the disclosure require-
ments. 
364 Id. at 208. 
616 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
essence of commercial speech:  the sale of a commercial product.  
And in the middle, we have factual disclosures about the presence of 
mercury and the number of calories in restaurant foods being chal-
lenged because the disclosures do not target deceptive and mislead-
ing speech.  As disclosure laws become an increasingly popular regu-
latory tool, courts will be forced to evaluate the First Amendment 
values implicated by compelled commercial speech, with little direc-
tion from the Supreme Court.  Although rational basis scrutiny assur-
edly is not always the appropriate level of scrutiny, this Article has 
demonstrated that First Amendment values are in fact protected and 
served by an extension of Zauderer’s framework to other factual sce-
narios. 
There are important limits to this doctrine, and this Article has 
highlighted one such limit on the type of speech that can be com-
pelled.  Another limit is the type of speech that can be required to 
carry such disclosures.  Zauderer only applies to commercial speech—
while this Article has argued for a more contextual, multi-factored 
definition of what constitutes commercial speech, the rational basis 
test assuredly does not apply to state laws compelling a doctor to give 
certain information to his patient during the course of medical 
treatment,365 or to laws that impose disclosure requirements on reli-
gious or political speech.  The limits on compelled speech outside of 
the commercial speech arena are beyond the scope of this Article, 
but further analysis is certainly warranted given the increasing prolif-
eration of state laws mandating physicians to give certain infor-
mation, arguably ideological information, to women getting abor-
tions.366  Such compelled speech requirements, which affect the 
actual practice of the profession rather than just the offer of profes-
sional services, raise different First Amendment concerns beyond 
those protected by the commercial speech doctrine.367 
 
365 See Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 23 (“Although the 
communication between a professional and her client might concern commercial mat-
ters, its regulation would almost certainly not be conceptualized as an issue of First 
Amendment commercial speech doctrine.  This suggests that we should distinguish be-
tween ‘impersonal’ communications that sustain a public of independent strangers, and 
‘personalized communications’ that constitute particular relationships of dependence.”). 
366 See Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 63 (discussing the First Amendment issues 
raised by a South Dakota statute requiring physicians to inform women contemplating an 
abortion that the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living hu-
man being, and that an increased risk of suicide and suicide ideation is a known medical 
risk of abortion). 
367 See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 83, at 784 (“The Central Hudson standard . . . does not 
limit the justifications for restrictions on commercial speech to the prevention of decep-
tion.”).  I evaluate the First Amendment issues raised by compelling physicians to engage 
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in the state’s ideological speech in another academic project.  See Keighley, supra note 
229. 
